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Abstract 
Nearly 30% of US banks employ at least one board member who currently serves (or has previously 
served) the Federal Reserve in a public service role. Public service roles take the form of Federal 
Reserve directorships or memberships in Federal Reserve advisory councils. We show that connections 
between banks and the Federal Reserve are linked to decreases in the sensitivity of bank leverage to 
risk. Further, connected banks extract larger public subsidies by shifting risk to the financial safety-net. 
Jointly, our results suggest that interactions between banks and regulators reduce supervisory 
effectiveness. 
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1. Introduction 
The governance of the US banking system is different from many other nations and 
firms in other regulated industries. Members of the banking industry have direct oversight of 
one of their regulators, their local Federal Reserve Banks. While there may be communication 
benefits to the Fed from such arrangements, they raise the question of whether private benefits 
accrue to banks at the expense of taxpayers—i.e., whether bankers connected to the Fed are 
foxes guarding the henhouse.  
Perhaps surprisingly, there is very little research on this topic. Adams (2017) documents 
positive market reactions to announcements that bankers obtain Federal Reserve Bank board 
directorships. However, the reason for this is not clear—it could be due to the preferential 
treatment of connected banks that allows these banks to risk shift at taxpayer expense. In this 
paper, we address this explanation. Using a framework that measures bank risk-taking and risk-
shifting to the financial safety-net (see Merton, 1977; Duan et al., 1992; Hovakimian and Kane, 
2000; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2008; 2012; 2013), we demonstrate that allowing bankers to serve 
in the Fed is associated with lower supervisory effectiveness that is costly to taxpayers. 
The two main responsibilities of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) are the conduct 
of monetary policy and the supervision of commercial banks (Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, 2018). For more than a century, the Fed has granted banks a privileged 
role in its governance. Bankers employed by banks that are under its purview sit on the boards 
of regional Federal Reserve Banks and serve on various advisory councils.1 While Fed directors 
                                                             
1 The 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks (Reserve Banks) are privately owned and partly governed by member 
banks in their district. The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 mandates that three out of the nine directors on a Reserve 
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are not involved in matters relating to the supervision of individual banks, their responsibilities 
include supervising the Reserve Bank’s operations, monitoring Reserve Bank Presidents and 
providing input on monetary policy. In addition, the Fed also relies heavily on advisory councils, 
consisting of bankers, to inform policy and forecasts of economic growth. 
 Representation of bankers in the Fed could facilitate regulatory capture. Stigler (1971) 
argues that regulators are frequently captured by the industries they regulate. Because 
regulators are subject to agency and behaviorial conflicts (e.g. career concerns, social 
relationships, identification and approval from industry), they may facilitate socially adverse 
outcomes by catering to the private interests of industry (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Dal Bo, 
2006). For instance, serving in the Fed allows bankers opportunities to establish social 
relationships with supervisors. This could undermine monitoring by making the relationship 
between supervisors and supervisees more communal (Mills and Clark, 1982).  
 The regulatory-capture view predicts that banks with directors who hold positions at the 
Fed (we refer to these as ‘connected banks’) will receive preferential treatment in supervision. 
Though regulatory capital requirements are rule-based, regulators have some discretion in 
evaluating the riskiness of bank assets and, by extension, the amount of capital that banks are 
required to hold against them (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 
2014). We test for regulatory capture by examining whether connected banks are able to 
increase risk-taking, and shift risk to the safety-net, at the expense of taxpayers. 
                                                             
Bank’s board of directors (Fed directors) are specifically appointed to represent member banks (Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013). 
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We start by identifying directors from US public Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) 
from years 2001-13 who served in a public service capacity at the Fed from their CVs.2 From 
there, we construct bank-level measures that indicate if the bank gains or loses board members 
that currently or previously served: (1) as directors on the board of a regional Reserve Bank or; 
(2) in advisory councils at the Fed in a public service capacity.3 Nearly 30% of banks in our 
sample employ at least one board member who either presently is or has previously been 
connected to the Fed in a public service capacity.  
In the presence of deposit insurance, the cost of risk-taking to shareholders of the bank 
is subsidized, incentivizing banks to increase risk at the expense of taxpayers (Merton, 1977; 
Allen and Gale, 2000; Anginer et al., 2014). To test if public service connections lead to lower 
supervisory effectiveness in safeguarding taxpayer interest, we follow a commonly used 
framework to measure risk-taking and shifting to the financial safety-net (Hovakimian and 
Kane, 2000; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2008; 2012; 2013; Bushman and Williams, 2012; Acharya 
et al., 2016).  
In this framework, the value of public subsidies afforded to shareholders of banks can 
be modelled as the value of a put option that is underwritten by the FDIC. To prevent banks 
from shifting risk to the safety-net, regulators must monitor and discipline bank risk-taking. 
They do so by requiring a commensurate decrease in leverage when bank risk increases (Duan 
                                                             
2 Throughout the paper, we use the term banks to refer to BHCs unless we need to distinguish between a BHC and 
banks operating under the BHC.  
3 We include previous as well as current connections because many of the effects of connections that our analysis 
is meant to identify outlast currently active connections. In robustness tests, we show that our results are robust to 
using only current public service connections.  
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et al., 1992).4 If the capital discipline imposed by regulators is insufficient to offset increases 
in risk, banks can increase the value of public subsidies by increasing risk.5, 6 
 Our baseline results indicate that connections to the Fed increase the gains to banks 
from shifting risk to the financial safety-net. On average, additions to public service 
connections increase the value of the implicit put option underwritten by the FDIC by 17%. 
This gain is achieved through an increase in risk-taking. The results hold after we include bank, 
regulator-year and state-year fixed effects. That is, we are able to identify the effects of 
connections within the same bank, while controlling for time-varying regulatory and state 
economic variables.  
We perform a variety of tests to establish the robustness of our results. First, we design 
a difference-in-difference (DiD) analysis around the planned retirements of regional Reserve 
Bank Presidents. The timing of planned retirements, when Presidents have reached retirement 
age, are guided by regulatory term limits that are largely outside the control of Presidents or 
the banks they supervise. We use these retirements as negative shocks to the quality of existing 
bank connections to the outgoing President and compare the effect on banks within the districts 
from which Presidents retire. Second, our baseline results hold after the inclusion of a large 
number of additional controls that alleviate concerns that public service in the Fed correlates 
                                                             
4 The intuition is that increases in the value of the put to banks come at the expense of the FDIC. As the value of 
the put option is dependent on risk and leverage, increases in risk must be met with decreases in leverage for the 
value of the put to remain constant. We discuss the model in detail in Section 2.2. 
5 While Reserve Banks do not explicitly target risk-shifting by banks, they enforce risk-based capital requirements 
which are designed to ensure that banks are able to absorb losses that are line with their asset risk. Therefore, more 
risk-shifting by banks implies higher potential losses to taxpayers and, thus, a loss of supervisory effectiveness.  
6 The two principal advantages of this approach over market or book measures of bank risk are that it (i) links 
shareholder benefits directly to the risk of bank assets, and (ii) offers a mechanism for how risk-shifting takes 
place (through a decrease in sensitivity of leverage to risk). Further, our approach includes market data that adjust 
quickly to reflect market expectations of changes in the risk of bank assets brought on by connectedness. 
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with omitted variables (e.g. other bank connections, market discipline, and additional CEO, 
board-level and county-level characteristics). Though our analyses do not allow us to 
conclusively draw a causal link, our evidence at a minimum provides insights into an important 
phenomenon, namely that serving in the Fed is associated with large increases in bank risk-
taking and shifting. 
We next investigate if risk-taking and shifting incentives increases for Fed connected 
banks in the post-crisis period. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act (EESA) was signed into law to stabilize financial markets. Consistent with 
the view that regulatory intervention increased moral hazard and bank risk-taking (Duchin and 
Soysura, 2014; Lambert et al., 2017) and signaled the willingness of regulators to engage in 
forbearance (Archarya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2011), we find that increases 
in connections to the Fed is associated with larger gains in risk-taking and shifting in the post-
crisis period, and for banks which receive bailout funds.  
The final section offers further results that support our risk-shifting narrative. We show 
that increases in Fed connectedness are associated with riskier bank policies, as shown from 
larger growth in lending, bad loans, risk-weighted assets, non-interest income and the volatility 
of earnings. However, the resulting riskier policies are not absorbed by shareholders and 
debtholders. There is no detectable change in stock-market measures of bank risk. Also, 
depositors (both insured and uninsured) do not require higher interest rates. This implies that, 
as banks engage in riskier activities, the risk-shifting we document ensures that taxpayers, and 
not bank shareholders or depositors, absorb the higher risk exposures of connected banks.  
 6 
This paper contributes to the political economy literature that provides evidence of how 
the financial industry captures politicians and regulators. Kroszner and Strahan (1999) show 
that interest groups are a strong determinant of the timing of banking deregulation in the USA. 
Igan et al. (2012) find that lobbying banks originated more risky mortgages in the pre-crisis 
period and were more likely to be recipients of bailout funds. Lambert (2018) show that 
lobbying banks are less likely to receive regulatory enforcement actions, while Duchin and 
Sosyura (2012), Li (2013), and Berger and Roman (2015) show that politically connected banks 
were more likely to be bailed out during the 2008 financial crisis.7 Acemoglu et al. (2016) find 
that banks with personal connections to Timothy Geithner experienced positive abnormal 
returns on his announcement of nominee for the US Treasury Secretary in 2008. On the other 
hand, Lucca et al. (2014) and Shive and Forster (2017) support the idea that financial 
institutions hire ex-regulators for their skills, rather than for purposes of capture. 
Our study adds to this area of research by documenting that having bankers serve in the 
Fed is associated with a decrease in supervisory effectiveness. In doing so, we identify a 
previously underexplored channel through which regulatory capture manifests itself. This 
channel is more insidious than others, such as lobbying, because it results from time-honored 
features of the way the Fed operates, features that presumably are intended to improve rather 
than undermine regulatory oversight.  
Our paper is also related to the extensive literature on moral hazard brought upon by 
government guarantees in the financial industry (see Calomiris and Jaremski (2016) for a 
                                                             
7 Similarly, Bayazitova and Shivdasani (2012) show that politically connected banks remained under the (“TARP”) 
bailout program for longer. This indicates that connected banks judge the negative consequences of government 
influence in a bailout program as lower compared with banks that lack strong political connections.   
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review). Related to deposit insurance, Wheelock and Wilson (1995), Demirguc-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), and Lambert et al. (2017) find that more generous schemes increase bank 
risk-taking and the likelihood of bank failures. Other studies test for explicit risk-shifting to the 
financial safety-net in the presence of deposit insurance. Carbo-Valverde et al. (2012) 
document that banks conduct cross-border mergers as a means of extracting safety-net benefits 
from countries with lower supervisory effectiveness. Similarly, Carbo-Valverde et al. (2013) 
and Acharya et al. (2016) find that too-big-to-fail banks are more able to extract subsidies from 
the safety-net. Duchin and Sosyura (2012; 2014) show that bailed-out US banks 
underperformed and took on more risk during the 2008 crisis.8  
 Our study contributes to this area of research by documenting that regulatory 
arrangements, whereby bankers serve in directorship and advisory roles at the Fed, exacerbate 
the moral hazard problem arising from deposit insurance. We also add to the literature on the 
effects of EESA by showing that risk-taking and shifting increased at connected banks after 
EESA, and in particular, for banks that were bailed out.  
Finally, our work is related to the literature on the determinants of bank risk-taking. 
Extant studies have found that amongst other factors, bank board composition (e.g., Berger et 
al., 2014; Minton et al., 2014; Vallascas et al., 2017; Anginer et al., 2018), CEO characteristics 
(e.g., Ho et al., 2016; King et al., 2016), CEO compensation incentives (e.g., Hagendorff and 
Vallascas, 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011) and culture (Fahlenbrach et al., 2012; Adhikari 
                                                             
8 Using German data, Dam and Koetter (2012) find increases in bailout expectations increases the probability of 
bank failures. Gropp et al. (2014) show that the removal of government guarantees led to safer savings banks. 
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and Agarwal, 2016) are related to bank risk-taking. We complement this by documenting that 
the experience and connections of bankers matter; serving the Fed leads to riskier bank policies.  
 
2. Institutional Setting and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 Institutional Setting 
The Federal Reserve System (The Fed) is headed by the Board of Governors (The Board), 
located in Washington D.C that oversees the activities of the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks 
(Reserve Banks). The 12 Reserve Banks operate in geographically segregated “districts” (or 
“regions”) and form the operating arms of The Board.9  
Amongst other duties such as the maintenance of payment services, the 12 regional 
Reserve Banks are tasked with the supervision of banks in their district. Additionally, 9 out of 
12 of the Reserve Banks have branches under them (24 branches in total).10 Each regional 
Reserve Bank is headed by a President. The 12 Reserve Banks and their 24 branches are each 
overseen by a board of directors (Reserve Bank directors). When carrying out their 
responsibilities, the Board of Governors and the 12 Reserve Banks (and their branches) rely 
extensively on a range of advisory councils.  
 Our study focuses on the members of a bank’s board who presently serve or have 
previously served the Federal Reserve System in a public service capacity. Public service roles 
                                                             
9 The 12 regional Fed Banks are: Boston (1), New York (2), Philadelphia (3), Cleveland (4), Richmond (5), Atlanta 
(6), Chicago (7), St Louis (8), Minneapolis (9), Kansas City (10), Dallas (11) and San Francisco (12). As of 2018, 
the Federal Reserve Banks of Boston, New York and Philadelphia do not have branches under them. The New 
York Fed had a Buffalo Branch but it was closed in 2008.  
10  Refer to https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/structure-federal-reserve-system.htm for more 
information pertaining to the general structure and duties of the Fed System.  
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at the Fed are different from full-time employment with regulators (e.g., bank supervisors or 
administrative staff at the Fed). Public service roles are positions undertaken by private sector 
individuals (including bankers) as a form of service to the public. The two main types of public 
service roles that bankers undertake at the Fed include: (1) a directorship with one of the 
regional Reserve Bank boards (or its branches) or; (2) membership in an advisory council (to 
advise the Board of Governors or the Reserve Banks).  
As regards Reserve Bank directorships, the 12 Federal Reserve Banks are each overseen 
by a 9-person board that is equally divided into three classes of directors (A, B and C). Class C 
directors are appointed by the Board of Governors to represent the public. Class A and B 
directors are elected by member banks in each of their 12 districts to represent the banks and 
the public, respectively. Class A directors are typically bank officers and directors of the 
commercial banks residing in the district in which the Reserve Bank operates.11 Branches of 
the Reserve Banks follow a similar structure as the regional Reserve Banks but have smaller 
boards (5 or 7-person boards).12 Reserve Bank directors generally serve staggered 3-year terms 
with a maximum of 2 terms.  
Directors of the Reserve Bank’s board are responsible for supervising the Reserve 
Bank’s operations, internal governance and its internal auditing procedures. They also hold 
senior Reserve Bank executives such as the President to account and provide input on monetary 
policy. Crucially, Reserve Bank directors are not involved in matters of supervision. That is, 
                                                             
11 Class B and C directors cannot be employees of the bank while serving Reserve Bank directorship positions. 
They are however not prohibited from joining banks after their tenure as Reserve Bank directors. Class B and C 
directors typically consist of senior executives of non-finance firms.  
12 For 5-person boards, 3 directors are Class A or B, and the rest, Class C, while 7-person boards consist of 2 Class 
A and B directors each and 3 Class C directors.  
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“[Fed] directors may not be consulted regarding bank examination ratings, potential 
enforcement actions, application/approval matters and other such supervisory matters” (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2013, pg. 41). Thus, Reserve Bank directors are 
not in a position to favor a particular bank directly, nor to acquire detailed knowledge pertaining 
to bank supervision. 
The second type of public service position we include in our analysis is membership in 
an advisory council to a Reserve Bank or to the Board of Governors. The range of advisory 
councils that bankers may serve in is extensive (see Panel D of Table 1). Because the raison 
d'être of advisory councils is the gathering of information from stakeholders in the 
implementation of monetary policy and regulation, banks tend to be well represented on 
advisory councils.13  
Advisory councils typically meet 2 to 4 times a year with their respective Reserve Bank 
Presidents (or the Board of Governors), consist of 10 to 12 members, have 2- to 3-year terms 
(with the possibility of extension) and varied responsibilities. For instance, the Federal 
Advisory Council (FAC) which advises the Board of Governors is “…composed of twelve 
representatives of the banking industry, consults with and advises the Board on all matters 
within the Board’s jurisdiction […]. [Each] year, each Reserve Bank chooses one person to 
                                                             
13 For instance, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York explains that it “meets regularly with small business 
leaders, community bankers, financial market participants, economists and others through external committees 
and outreach programs to obtain essential perspectives on the economy from both Main Street and Wall Street. 
These interactions help the New York Fed to provide timely information to the Federal Reserve System and to 
support the formulation and implementation of monetary policy effectively” (Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
2015). 
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represent its District on the FAC, and members customarily serve three one-year terms” (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 2016). 
2.2 Modelling Bank Subsidies 
Our main approach uses the deposit insurance premium model pioneered by Merton (1977) and 
later developed by Duan et al. (1992) and Hovakimian and Kane (2000) which offers a tool to 
estimate the subsidies afforded to banks. Merton (1977) models safety-net subsidies as the 
value of a put option underwritten by the FDIC (and by extension, the taxpayer). On a 
conceptual level, deposit insurance permits banks to put the assets back to the FDIC at the face 
value of its debt whenever the value of assets falls below the value of liabilities. Therefore, 
bank shareholders can extract higher public subsidies by increasing the value of the put option 
if they increase asset risk and leverage.14  
This model is widely used to test for risk-shifting by banks to the financial safety-net 
(e.g. Duan et al. 1992; Hovakimian and Kane, 2000; Wagster, 2007; Bushman and Williams, 
2012; Carbo-Valverde et al., 2008; 2012; 2013; Acharya et al, 2016). Risk-shifting is distinct 
from risk-taking in that the former arises when a contractual counterparty (in this case, the 
taxpayer) is inadequately compensated for the risks to which they are exposed. The model 
permits us to investigate if having directors that served in the Fed influences supervisory 
effectiveness and allow banks to extract larger benefits from the financial safety-net by 
increasing risk. 
                                                             
14 The idea corresponds to the valuation of a put option. The value of a put option increases in volatility (bank 
asset risk) and leverage (the strike price).  
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This paper adopts the quasi-reduced form equations developed by Duan et al. (1992) 
and Hovakimian and Kane (2000):   
(B/V) = α0 + α1σV + ε1           (1) 
IPP = β0 + β1σV + ε2              (2) 
where B is the book value of debt, V the market value of bank assets, B/V the leverage ratio, sV 
the volatility of the bank’s assets and IPP is the per-period flow of subsidies to bank 
shareholders, defined as the actuarially fair insurance premium percentage per dollar of debt. 
The estimation of V, sV and IPP is described in Appendix B.  
 The slope coefficients of Equations (1) and (2) have the following interpretations: 
α1 = d(B/V) / dσV           (3) 
β1 = dIPP / dσV  = (∂IPP / ∂σV ) + ∂IPP / ∂(B/V)α1        (4) 
Equation (1) describes the notion that regulators restrict banks to certain combinations of 
leverage and volatility. Accordingly, Equation (1) reflects regulatory discipline as reducing 
(increasing) bank leverage as an institution’s asset risk increases (decreases). Equation (2) 
measures if banks are able to increase the value of public subsidies by increasing risk after 
overcoming the effects of discipline imposed by regulators. 
For regulatory forces to fully neutralize risk-shifting incentives, two joint conditions 
have to be satisfied: 
Leverage decreases with asset volatility: α1 < 0  
The value of public subsidies (IPP) does not rise with asset volatility: β1  0. 
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A negative α1, while indicative of disciplinary forces imposed on a bank, is insufficient 
to show that regulatory discipline mitigates the incentives for risk-shifting. To fully neutralize 
risk-shifting incentives, the decline in leverage must be sufficiently large to offset increases in 
the value of public subsidies that would be generated by increasing asset volatility (β1  0). If 
so, banks would not find it advantageous to increase risk. 
2.3 Hypothesis and Empirical Model 
We hypothesize that allowing bankers to serve in the Fed leads to regulatory capture. As put 
forth by Stigler (1971), the framework theorizes that regulators are often beholden to the 
industry and firms under their supervision. Information asymmetry surrounding supervision 
grants discretionary powers to regulators, who might not necessarily work to promote societal 
welfare, but instead, seek to further their own private interests (Baron and Myerson, 1982; 
Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Dal Bo, 2006). The institutional setting of the Fed in allowing bankers 
opportunities to establish connections with regulators can exacerbate capture.  
The private interests that regulators pursue could either be economic or in terms of 
utility (or both). With regard to economic interest, the prospect of future employment in the 
banking sector could incentivize a regulator to be less stringent in their supervision in an 
attempt to promote relationships with the industry, or the firm that they are supervising (e.g., 
Cornaggia et al., 2016; Horton et al., 2017). With regard to utility, regulators could seek to 
protect their social connections with bankers that they personally know by avoiding “rocking 
the boat” (Barth et al., 2012). Regardless of the reason, allowing bankers opportunities to take 
up positions at the Fed alters the dynamics between supervisor and supervisee—the relationship 
becomes more communal (Mills and Clark, 1982), undermining supervisory effectiveness. 
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Several features of the banking industry further exacerbate regulatory capture. 
Information asymmetry between supervisors and banks is likely to be relatively severe, given 
the complexity and opacity of a bank’s portfolio (Dang et al., 2017). In addition, even though 
regulatory capital requirements are rule-based, supervisors have broad discretion in evaluating 
the riskiness of bank assets and the amount of capital that banks should hold against them 
(Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014). Importantly, there is 
evidence that banks consciously exploit the combination of information gaps and regulatory 
discretion; banks choose to strategically underreport their riskiness to regulators when they 
have incentives to do so—when they have lower capitalization levels (Begley et al., 2017; 
Plosser and Santos, 2018).  
 The regulatory-capture view therefore predicts that banks who have directors that are 
currently serving (or used to) serve in the Fed would receive preferential treatment in 
supervision. We expect that risk-taking increases and risk discipline decreases at connected 
banks, leading to increased risk-shifting and access to larger public subsidies. This could arise 
due to less stringent ongoing regulatory supervision (Adams, 2017; Lambert, 2018) or 
decreases in market discipline that arise because of updated expectations of supervisory laxity 
or explicit bailouts in adverse conditions (Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; Li, 2013; Berger and 
Roman, 2015). We do not require distinction between the two channels—our framework 
hypothesizes that regulatory capture leads to preferential treatment of banks.  
To empirically analyze if regulatory connections are linked to risk, and subsequently, 
larger public subsidies, we modify Equations (1) and (2) as: 
(B/V)i,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t  x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t  + 
 15 
                                       Bank Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t                      (5) 
 
IPPi,t = β0 + β1σVi,t + β2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t  x σVi,t t + β3 α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t  + 
                                    Bank Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t        (6) 
 
where i indexes bank, t indexes calendar year. Fed Gain (Loss) is our main measure of 
regulatory connections and is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in 
the number of directors of the bank board who have public service experience at the Fed 
(defined in greater detail in Section 3.2), and 0 otherwise.  
The coefficient α2 captures the effect of gains and losses of connectedness to the Fed 
on regulatory discipline imposed on banks in response to increasing risk (sensitivity of changes 
in leverage to changes in risk).  
Hypothesis 1: Gaining (losing) Fed public service connections leads to lower (higher) levels 
of leverage-risk sensitivity (α2 > 0). 
If a2 > 0 and a bank’s risk increases, the leverage of banks that gain (lose) connections does 
not decrease (increase) by as much as the leverage of banks that do not change their 
connectedness to the Fed.   
The interaction term β2 measures the effect of which gains and losses of connectedness 
to the Fed on access to larger public subsidies.   
Hypothesis 2:  Gaining (losing) Fed public service connections leads to higher public subsidies 
if bank risk increases (β2 > 0). 
 16 
If β2 > 0 and a bank’s risk increases, gains (losses) in Fed connections mean higher (lower) 
gains to risk-shifting.  
 
3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Sample Construction 
Our initial sample consists of all public US banks from 2001 to 2013 covered in BoardEx. 
BoardEx provides detailed biographical and employment (current and historical) data on all 
members of the board which allows us to identify public service positions held at the Fed. 
BoardEx’s data on corporate directors starts in 2001 and is drawn from various sources, 
including SEC filings, company press releases, corporate websites and news outlets. We retain 
deposit-taking banks with SIC codes starting 602 (commercial banks) and 603 (savings 
institutions).  
< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE > 
We match our list of BoardEx banks to 4th Quarter FR Y9-C consolidated accounting 
information reported by banks to the Federal Reserve. Market information is obtained from 
CRSP. The final sample of banks contains 2,539 bank-year observations consisting of 411 
unique banks spanning years 2002-2013.15 Appendix A provides definitions of the variables 
used in this study. Summary statistics are reported in Panel A of Table 1.  
3.2 Bank Regulatory Connections 
                                                             
15 While data from BoardEx begins in 2001, our analysis is conducted from years 2002 onwards due to first-
differencing. 
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We identify members of a bank’s board that are currently serving or have previously served the 
Fed in a public service capacity; that is, serving in the Fed in various roles while being 
employed in the private sector. We include previous as well as current public service positions, 
because the potential benefits of a connection (e.g. personal familiarity with regulators) will 
arguably outlast the period during which the connection is active. 
Our main variable of interest, Fed Gain (Fed Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if 
there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of a bank board who have public 
service experience in the Fed, and 0 otherwise. This includes Reserve Bank directorship 
positions at the 12 regional Federal Reserve Banks (and their 24 branches) as well as 
memberships in various advisory councils at all levels of the Fed (Reserve Banks as well as the 
Board of Governors). Information on each director’s employment history is from BoardEx. We 
manually supplement missing information from Federal Reserve annual reports, legal 
documents, LinkedIn, Marquis Who’s Who, and news sources such as Bloomberg, the Wall 
Street Journal, and the Financial Times. Panel D of Table 1 lists the public service roles that 
bank directors have undertaken or are currently serving in at the Fed.  
In robustness tests, we employ three alternate definitions of connectedness to the Fed 
and find broadly similar results.  First, we use Current Fed Gain (Loss), which is = 1 if there is 
an increase (decrease) in the number of bank directors who are presently undertaking (ending) 
public service positions at the Fed. We also use Fed Directorship Gain (Loss) and Fed Advisory 
Gain (Loss) which are = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the 
bank who have experience as a Reserve Bank director, or an advisor in the various advisory 
councils, respectively.  
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Panels B and C of Table 1 show descriptive statistics for banks with public service 
connections. From Panel B, 27% of bank-years in our sample have at least 1 director with public 
service connections to the Fed. 23% (11%) of bank-years have at least 1 director with Reserve 
Bank directorship (advisory council) experience. Additionally, directors who undertake public 
service roles at the Fed are not limited to a small subset of banks; 129 out of 448 (29%) banks 
in our sample have at least 1 director connected this way. In Panel C, we show the breakdown 
by year of the gains and losses of connections to the Fed as well as the number of banks with 
at least 1 director with public service experience. As observed, public service connections 
between banks and regulators are widespread.  
3.3 Control Variables 
Our control variables broadly correspond to the CAMELS ratings system. CAMELS—an 
acronym for capital adequacy, asset quality, management quality, earnings, liquidity and 
sensitivity to market risk—is a composite supervisory rating system used by bank supervisors 
to assess the safety and soundness of a bank.16 Because we control for risk-shifting incentives, 
we interact all control variables with σv. Bank safety and soundness are likely to affect the gains 
from risk-shifting, because banks in poor financial condition may have more to gain (Eisdorfer, 
2008; Bushman and Williams, 2012) or, alternatively, these banks may receive more regulatory 
attention and thus be less able to shift risk. As CAMELS ratings are confidential, we employ 
proxies for each component. 
We measure capital adequacy using Tier-1 Capital and proxy for asset quality using 
Bad Loans. We also include as controls several board-level corporate governance variables for 
                                                             
16 See https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/ 
 19 
the quality of management. We proxy for the effectiveness of monitoring and advisory 
functions of the board using Board Size and Board Independence (e.g. Adams and Mehran, 
2012; Minton et al., 2014; Vallascas et al., 2017; Anginer et al., 2018), and for the power of a 
CEO in affecting risk policies using CEO Tenure and CEO Duality (e.g. Ellul and Yerramilli, 
2013).  
Earnings and liquidity are proxied by ROA and Total Deposits, respectively. We proxy 
for Market Risk using the gap between short-term assets and short term-liabilities scaled by 
total assets. The gap approximates the net amount of assets and liabilities that is required to be 
repriced within one year, reflecting the bank’s sensitivity to interest rate risk. Further, we 
control for firm size using the log of Total Assets and its value squared. Carbo-Valverde et al. 
(2013) show that too-big-to-fail banks are able to access larger public subsidies.  
4. Baseline Results 
4.1 Changes in Connections and Risk-Taking: Sensitivity of Bank Leverage to Risk 
Table 2 shows how gains and losses of public service connections to the Federal Reserve affect 
risk-taking by banks, measured using its leverage-risk sensitivity (Hypothesis 1). If increases 
in connectedness are useful for banks, we expect decreases in leverage to be less sensitive to 
risk increases when the number of connected directors rises. By the same token, we expect 
decreases in leverage to be more sensitive to risk increases when the number of connected 
directors falls. 
Our results confirm these expectations. The coefficient on our main interaction term of 
interest, Fed Gain x σv, is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level in Columns (1) 
to (6). This shows that, when banks gain connections to the Fed, banks reduce their leverage 
 20 
less for a given increase in asset risk, compared to banks that have not increased their 
connections. In Columns (7) to (12), we show that reductions in Fed connections, as indicated 
by a negative sign on the interaction term Fed Loss x σv, lead to increases in the sensitivity of 
leverage to risk, as compared to banks that have not lost any connections. 
These results hold under a range of different specifications and fixed effects that 
examine variation in the sensitivity of leverage to risk both across banks and within individual 
banks. In Columns (1) and (7), we include only bank, regulator and year fixed effects to show 
that our results are not driven by our choice of control variables. While all BHCs in our sample 
are supervised by the Fed, some banks operating under the umbrella of a BHC are supervised 
by a different federal agency (the FDIC or the OCC). Regulator fixed effects therefore controls 
for the regulator of the largest commercial bank operating under the BHC. 
< INSERT TABLE 2 HERE > 
In Columns (2) to (3) and (8) to (9), we include our vector of control variables and use 
a combination of regulator and year fixed effects, with and without bank fixed effects. For 
brevity, we only show the interaction term between control variables and σv and omit the level 
terms.17 Our results are therefore robust to time-invariant omitted bank and regulator variables 
(e.g. a bank’s risk culture or regulatory style) that could explain the risk sensitivity of bank 
leverage (e.g., Fahlenbrach et al., 2012) 
Columns (4) and (10) control for a bank’s headquarters state-year and regulator-year 
fixed effects. The inclusion of regulator-year fixed effects allows us to to control for any time-
                                                             
17 In unreported robustness tests, we find similar results when we do not interact control variables with σv. 
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varying changes in the intensity of supervision (Agarwal et al., 2014). Further, state-year fixed 
effects controls for state-level changes in regulations, laws or economic conditions that could 
affect bank business policies. Column (5) and (11) adds bank fixed effects to this specification 
to demonstrate that these results hold in a within-bank specification as well as an across-bank 
specification (Columns (4) and (10)).  
Finally, Columns (6) and (12) control for year-, regulator-, and size ventile-year fixed 
effects. In this set-up, we examine variation in the risk sensitivity of bank leverage within 20 
size groups (by assets). The size ventile-year fixed effects are particularly important in ruling 
out concerns that banks of different size might have different propensities to establish 
connections or shift risk. For instance, larger (too-big-to-fail) banks may show a higher 
propensity for acquiring public service roles (Adams, 2017) and for risk-taking (Carbo-
Valverde, 2013). The inclusion of this fixed effects means that we our results hold within 
individual size groups.18 
 The results are economically meaningful. For instance, in Column (5) and (11), a gain 
(loss) in Fed connectedness decreases (increases) the sensitivity of leverage to risk by 6.1% 
(8.3%).19 This economic magnitude is comparable to that found in other studies involving 
regulatory capture. Duchin and Sosyura (2014) find that politically connected banks that 
received bailout funds in the crisis increased the riskiness of their mortgage loans by 5.4%. 
Similarly, Igan et al. (2012) show that lobbying banks originate mortgage loans that are 
                                                             
18 For example, in 2005, there are 258 banks in our analysis. Therefore, the ventile-year fixed-effects identifies 
the variation in sensitivity of bank leverage to risk for changes in the number of  bank directors with public service 
experience split by asset size (approximately 13 banks per size group).  
19 These percentages are calculated as: [(-9.4+0.57)/-9.4]-1 and [(-11.1-0.92)/-11.1]-1, respectively. 
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approximately 8% riskier. Overall, our findings support Hypothesis 1 that connected banks are 
better able to capture regulators and increase their level of risk. This can lead to capital arbitrage 
by holding less capital as asset risk increases.  
4.2 Changes in Connections and Risk-shifting  
A lower sensitivity of leverage to risk is a necessary but insufficient condition for connected 
banks to extract subsidies from the financial safety-net. For this to occur, banks need to be able 
to increase the value of their put option on the taxpayer.  
 < INSERT TABLE 3 HERE > 
Table 3 reports results from estimating Equation (6) (Hypothesis 2). The coefficient on 
σV is positive and significant at the 1% level in Columns (1) and (7).20 This indicates that by 
increasing asset risk, banks are able to extract larger public subsidies from the safety-net. Our 
key coefficient of interest in Columns (1) to (6), on Fed Gain x σv, is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level, indicating that increases in the number of directors on a bank’s 
board with Fed public service experience increase a bank’s gain from risk-shifting to the safety-
net. In Columns (7) to (12), we observe similar results. A reduction in connections to the Fed 
leads to decreases in risk-shifting to the safety-net (as observed by the negative coefficient on 
Fed Loss x σv). 
As previously, our specifications estimate the effects of gains and losses of Fed 
connections within- and across-banks as well as well as within 20 bank size groups and within 
groups of banks supervised by the same regulator in the same state in the same year. The 
                                                             
20 The coefficient on σV is not significant in the other columns because we interact all of the control variables with 
σV and the significance needs to be jointly estimated.  
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economic significance is also sizable. For instance, in Columns (5) and (11), a gain (loss) in 
connections to the Fed increases (decreases) the gains from risk-shifting by 17.3% (15.9%).21 
The results in this section show that captured banks are better able to shift risk to the safety-net 
and access larger public subsidies. This leads to socially adverse outcomes because the taxpayer 
is subsidizing risk-taking by banks that are connected.  
 
5. Effects of Retirements of Reserve Bank Presidents on Risk-taking and Risk-Shifting 
5.1 Retirements of Reserve Bank Presidents 
Our empirical set-up does not allow us to interpret our results as a clean causal effect of public 
service connections on risk-shifting. Public service connections are not randomly assigned to 
banks and their establishment could be correlated with omitted variables that are related with 
bank risk, leverage and risk-shifting. Therefore, we use a separate empirical strategy in this 
section to corroborate our findings. 
We exploit the planned retirements of regional Reserve Bank Presidents as shocks to 
the quality of existing bank connections. The timing of planned retirements, when Reserve 
Bank Presidents having reach retirement age, are largely outside the control of Presidents (and 
banks), and are therefore plausibly exogenous to bank risk-shifting or supervisory 
effectiveness. 22 Since planned retirements arise due to term-limits and span different 
                                                             
21 These percentages are calculated as: [(-1.637+0.283)/-1.637]-1 and [(-2.52-0.4)/-2.52]-1, respectively. 
22 “Reserve Bank presidents are subject to mandatory retirement upon becoming 65 years of age. However, 
presidents initially appointed after age 55 can, at the option of the board of directors, be permitted to serve until 




geographical locations and years, it is less likely that these retirements coincide with time-
variant omitted variables that are correlated with connections or risk-shifting (we include bank 
fixed effects). While we are unable to design an experiment that randomly allocates connections 
to banks, relying on the retirements of Fed Presidents is still useful because it provides external 
variation to the quality of public service connections that have been endogenously established. 
Crucially, the planned retirement of a regional Reserve Bank President should decrease 
the ability of a connected bank to shift risk. A Reserve Bank President is arguably the single 
most powerful Fed officer within their district and, if personal familiarity with a President gives 
rise to benefits for a connected bank, the connection will be less conducive to risk-shifting post-
retirement. We therefore predict that banks with connections will experience a decrease in gains 
from risk-shifting if the President of a particular Reserve Bank retires, compared to a control 
group of banks without connections that are located in the same Federal Reserve district.  
< INSERT TABLE 4 HERE > 
We adopt a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy to analyze how connections affect 
risk-shifting following a negative shock to the quality of existing connections. Crucial to our 
empirical set-up is that within each of the 12 Reserve Bank districts, some banks are connected 
to the Reserve Bank from which the President retires while other banks are not. Our set-up 
therefore exploits variation in the quality of bank connections within each of the 12 regional 
Reserve Bank districts. An advantage of this identification strategy is that we are comparing 
connected banks to themselves before the shock and to a group of control banks. Further, there 
are multiple planned retirements affecting different banks that are supervised by different 
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Federal Reserve districts across time. This alleviates concerns that omitted variables coinciding 
with a single retirement are correlated with risk-shifting. 
We identify the years in which Reserve Bank Presidents retire from Federal Reserve 
documents and their corresponding websites. We classify a retirement as “planned” if the 
President retired up to 1 year before the maximum retirement age. Using this criterion, we 
classify the retirements of 7 regional Reserve Bank President as planned (listed in Panel B of 
Table 4).23 We conduct searches on Factiva and various news websites to confirm that the 
retirements were previously planned rather than forced and perhaps related to aspects of 
supervisory effectiveness.  
We perform the DiD tests using variants of the following model: 
B/Vi,k,t or IPPi,k,t = α + β1σVi,k,t + β2Treatedi,k,t + β3Postk,t + β4 Treatedi,k,t x Postk,t + β5Treatedi,k,t 
x σVi,k,t + β6Postk,t x σVi,k,t + β7Treatedi,k,t x Postk,t x σVi,k,t + Bank Controlsi,k,t + Fixed Effects   
                                                                  + εi,t                              (7) 
 where i, k and t indexes bank, Federal Reserve districts and year respectively. We use a 
unbalanced 5-year window (t-2, t-1, t, t+1, t+2) around the year the regional Reserve Bank 
President retires (year t). Post is a dummy variable that equals 0 for years t-2 and t-1 and takes 
the value of 1 for years t to t+2 by Fed District. For instance, the President of Richmond Fed, 
                                                             
23 Our original sample consists of 14 retirements. We exclude Timothy Geithner (Fed Bank of New York President 
in 2008 who later took up the position of Secretary of the Treasury), Janet Yellen (Fed Bank Of San Francisco 
President in 2010 who took up positions as Vice Chairman, then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System) and Thomas Hoenig (Fed Bank of Kansas President in 2011 who late become Vice 
Chairman of the FDIC) as they constitute “reassignments” within regulatory agencies. We further exclude 4 Fed 
President Retirements as they do not coincide with our definition of “planned” retirements, because these 
Presidents left the job “early”. Out of these 7 planned retirements we identify, 6 Presidents served till their 
maximum tenure age. Only 1 retired 1 year before the maximum tenure age.  
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Mr Broaddus, retired in 2004. Banks under the Richmond Fed take Post values of 0 for years 
2002-2003, and values of 1 for years 2004-2006.  
 We allocate banks to the treatment group Treated (Treated = 1) if they have at least one 
member of the board who has served alongside the outgoing President in a public service role 
in the 5-year DiD window surrounding the retirement. Additionally, treated banks must be 
located in the Fed district which the retiring President was in charge of. This definition therefore 
ensures that our treatment group has bank directors that served alongside the outgoing President.  
The group of control banks (Treated = 0) are banks which are located in the district of 
the retiring President but have no public service connections to the Reserve Bank over the 5-
year window. Our main variable of interest is the triple interaction term Treated x Post x σV 
which shows how the marginal effects of Reserve Bank President retirements on the sensitivity 
of B/V and IPP to σV differ between treated banks and non-connected control banks.  
5.2 Retirements of Reserve Bank Presidents, Bank Risk-taking and Risk-shifting Results 
We show summary statistics for both our treated and control groups in t-1 (the year before 
retirement) in Panel A of Table 4. In total, we have 26 treated and 88 control banks. Importantly, 
the means of ∆B/V, ∆σV and ∆IPP, our variables of interest, are not insignificantly different 
between treated and control banks. While the parallel trends assumption is not directly testable, 
this provides some support for the assumption which requires trends in outcomes to be similar 
for both the control and treatment groups prior to the shock. We further observe that some 
differences in covariates exist between treated and control groups prior to the shock, the most 
salient of which is bank size. Treated banks tend to be larger than control banks. This is 
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unsurprising as larger banks have increased chances of obtaining Reserve Bank directorships 
(Adams, 2017) as well as advisory council positions.  
Fortunately, the DiD set-up lets us compare banks to themselves before and after a 
shock; differences in characteristics between banks are therefore differenced out (Roberts and 
Whited, 2012).24 To further alleviate concerns that differences in bank characteristics could 
affect risk-shifting differentially after retirements, we interact our Bank Controls x σV variable 
with Post. Doing so ensures that we control for the possibility that different bank characteristics 
could produce different reactions to the shock. 
Panel C of Table 4 shows the results for risk-taking (leverage-risk sensitivity, Columns 
(1) to (5) and risk-shifting, Columns (6) to (10). The coefficient on Treated x Post x σV is 
negative in most specifications in Columns (1) to (5), indicating that the leverage at connected 
banks shows a higher sensitivity to risk following a negative shock to connections. In Columns 
(6) to (10), the coefficient on Treated x Post x σV is also negative and statistically significant 
throughout different specifications. Thus, the gains from risk-shifting decrease at connected 
banks relative to our control group after the retirement of their respective regional Reserve 
Bank Presidents.  
The results are robust to the inclusion of different fixed effects. For instance, in 
Columns (1) to (2) and (6) to (7), we include bank, regulator and year fixed effects (with and 
                                                             
24 While we are aware that differences in observable characteristics between treated and control banks could hint 
that unobservable omitted variables exist and bias our results, this is unlikely as we include a multiplicity of fixed 
effects in our estimations which minimizes this issue. For instance, in Panel A of Table 4, we observe that treated 
banks tend to be larger. In our estimations, we include bank as well as size-ventile-year fixed effects, which means 
that we are estimating the treatment effects within size groups, thereby alleviating concerns that size might be 
correlated with both risk-shifting and regulatory connectedness.  
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without control variables). In Columns (3) and (8), we include bank, state-year and regulator-
year fixed effects. In Columns (6) and (10), size ventile-year, state and regulator fixed effects 
are included. Overall, the findings are consistent with our predictions that connections facilitate 
risk-shifting and that a negative shock to the efficacy of existing connections reduces 
opportunities to shift risk.  
 Finally, we conduct a dynamic timing-effects test to ascertain that the treatment effects 
of the DiD estimation are due to planned retirements as opposed to some omitted variable or 
other events that might coincide with the timing of the retirement. We follow Bertrand and 
Mullainathan (2003) and replace our Post variable with four indicator variables; Postt-1, Postt, 
Postt+1, Postt+2. These variables equal 1 for the relevant year with respect to the retirement, and 
0 otherwise. We interact the variables with Treated x σV. The results are in Panel D of Table 4. 
As observed, the reduction in risk-shifting gains at connected banks is mostly detectable in the 
second year after a President retires. Crucially, there are no effects in the pre-shock period, 
ruling out concerns of reverse causality. 
 While we attempt to establish a causal link between public service connections and bank 
risk-taking and shifting through our DiD setup, we are nonetheless aware that it does not allow 
us to unambiguously infer causality. However, our evidence provides insights into an important 
phenomenon of economic interest. At a minimum, our results imply that regulators can identify 
sizable increases in bank risk-shifting by focusing on banks that have established public service 
connections.  
 
6. Risk-taking and Risk-shifting in the Post-Crisis and Bailout Period 
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In this section, we investigate whether the extensive bailouts and subsidies provided to the 
financial sector during the crisis of 2008 altered the regulatory environment, thereby 
incentivizing Fed connected banks to increase risk-taking and shifting. We go on to test if these 
effects are stronger for Fed connected banks that were bailed out.  
In 2008, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act (EESA) was enacted in response 
to the financial crisis. To stabilize the economy, EESA contained multiple provisions, including 
the largest taxpayer-financed bailout in US history (cf. Duchin and Sosyura, 2012; 2014), 
increased insurance coverage limits for depositors (cf. Lambert et al., 2017) as well as short-
term lending to banks (cf. Berger et al., 2017).  
We hypothesize that after the enactment of EESA, increases in connections to the Fed 
will increase risk-taking and shifting more relative to before the crisis. Our expectation follows 
the well-documented moral hazard effect of public guarantees on increased bank risk-taking 
(Gropp et al., 2011; 2014; Dam and Koetter, 2012). Importantly, the literature has demonstrated 
that EESA has led to an increase in moral hazard and risk-taking at US banks (Duchin and 
Soysura, 2014; Lambert et al., 2017). Furthermore, EESA signaled the willingness of regulators 
to engage in forbearance during crisis times (Archarya and Yorulmazer, 2007; Brown and Dinç 
2011). If there are benefits of laxity in regulatory scrutiny brought upon by connections with 
the Fed, we should expect this to be stronger in the presence of heightened regulatory 
forbearance and moral hazard. 
< INSERT TABLE 5 HERE > 
 We estimate variants of the following equation with various fixed effects to test our 
hypothesis that EESA altered risk-taking and shifting incentives in the financial sector: 
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B/V or IPPi,t = α + β1σVi,t + β2 Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + β3 Post-Crisis08-13 + β4Fed Gain 
(Loss)i,t x Post-Crisis08-13 + β5Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + β6 Post-Crisis08-13 x σVi,t + β7Fed Gain  
(Loss)i,t x Post-Crisis08-13 x σVi,t + Bank Controlsi,t + Fixed Effects + εi,t                           (8) 
where Post-Crisis08-13 is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years 2008 to 2013 and 0 
otherwise.25 Our main variables of interest is the interaction term Fed Gain (Loss) x Post-
Crisis08-13 x σV which indicates if increases (decreases) in connections to the Fed increase 
(decrease) the gains from risk-taking and shifting in the post-crisis period.  
 The results are shown in Panel A of Table 5. The coefficient on Fed Gain x Post-
Crisis08-13 x σV is statistically significant in Columns (1) to (3) and (7) to (9). This supports our 
prediction that following EESA, connections to the Fed led to greater gains from risk-shifting 
compared with before the Act (Columns (7) to (9)), due to decreases in the sensitivity of 
leverage to risk (Columns (1) to (3)). The opposite results are observed when connections to 
the Fed are lost (negative sign on Fed Loss x Post-Crisis08-13 x σV) in Columns (4) to (6) and 
(10) to (12). Note that our results control for banks that receive bailout funds in 2008 (CPP08-
13 x σV). Therefore, our analysis identifies the risk-taking and shifting effects of Fed connections 
post-crisis, after controlling for the moral hazard effects stemming from bailout support that 
individual institutions received. 
 In Panel B of Table 5, we directly test the conjecture that conditional on receiving 
bailout funds in the crisis, risk-taking and shifting increased at Fed connected banks. Duchin 
and Soysura (2014) show that bailed-out banks make riskier loans compared to banks that did 
not receive bailout funds. The authors conduct various tests and conclude that increase in moral 
                                                             
25 In unreported results, we find similar results when we define Post-Crisis as 2009-2013, 2010-2013 or 2011-
2013.  
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hazard contributed to the increase in risk-taking at bailed out banks, in line with theoretical 
predictions by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007). Subsequently, we expect that the increase in 
moral hazard at bailed-out banks due to the upward revision of probability of future bailouts 
would be exacerbated for Fed connected banks (Bayazitova and Shivdasani, 2012). 
 This is what we observe in Panel B. The coefficient on the triple interaction term Fed 
Gain (Loss) x CPP08-13 x σV is positive and significant in Columns (1)-(3) and (7)-(9) and 
negative in Columns (4)-(6) and (10-12). Risk-taking and shifting is stronger for banks that 
increase connections to the Fed in the post-crisis period after they receive bailout funds.  Given 
that the Fed still continues to rely on bankers to serve in public service roles, one implication 
of these findings is that these institutional arrangements became potentially more precarious 
for supervisors, and more valuable for banks, after the crisis.  
 
7.  Additional Analysis on Risk-shifting to Taxpayers: Evidence from Shareholders and 
Debtholders 
In this section, we present two additional sets of results, involving: 1) shareholder risk exposure, 
and; 2) debtholders’ required rate of returns, to buttress our interpretation that banks utilize 
public service connections to the Federal Reserve to shift risk to the taxpayer. 
7.1 Riskier Bank Activities and No Increase in Equity Risk 
The model proposed by Merton (1977) is useful in measuring risk-shifting from equity holders 
to the taxpayer through a specific channel; a reduction in the sensitivity of bank leverage to 
changes in bank risk. To corroborate our main findings, we first show that Fed connected banks 
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do increase their risk-taking through various policies. Second, we show that although connected 
banks undertake riskier policies, equity holders do not view these banks as riskier, implying 
that risk has been shifted to the taxpayer. 
  We employ the standard deviation of ROA (σROA, Columns (1) to (2) of Table 6), 
growth in loans (∆Loans, Columns (3) to (4)), bad loans (∆Bad Loans, Columns (5) to (6)), 
risk-weighted assets (∆RWA, Columns (7) to (8)) and non-interest income (∆NI Income, 
Columns (9) to (10)) as proxies for risky bank policies.26 For instance, Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010) find that high levels of non-interest income leads to greater risk, while 
Fahlenbrach et al. (2017) report that that high loan growth precedes lower quality lending and 
worse bank performance.  
< INSERT TABLE 6 & 7 HERE > 
Table 6 show that banks that gain (lose) connections to the Fed (Panel A and B 
respectively) engage in riskier (safer) activities. Banks that gain (lose) connections have higher 
(lower) standard deviation of ROA, and higher growth in loans, bad loans, risk-weighted assets 
and non-interest income. Further, the results are economically significant. For instance, upon 
establishing Fed connections, the growth in risk-weighted assets (RWA) increases by 50% as 
compared to the mean (Column (8) of Panel A). An additional advantage of this analysis that 
complements our main findings is that we are able to shed light on how banks become riskier; 
they do so through aggressively growing their loan book, risky assets and non-interest income.  
                                                             
26 Refer to Appendix A for the construction of these variables. 
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Absent risk-shifting to the taxpayer, we would expect riskier activities to be linked to 
higher risk exposures for equity holders. However, Table 7 shows that changes in public service 
connections to the Fed do not lead to higher equity risk. We use two market measures of risk 
exposures of equity investors. First, we compute Tail Risk (Columns (1) to (2) and (5) to (6)) 
as the negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the worst 5% trading days of 
the year. Second, we compute σStock Rets (Columns (3) to (4) and (7) to (8)) as the standard 
deviation of the daily stock returns of the BHC’s stock over the year. In all columns, we show 
that gains and losses of Fed connections are not associated with increases in either market risk 
measure. Taken together, the results in this section supports the risk-shifting narrative we 
document in the previous sections; taxpayers (and not bank shareholders) absorb the higher risk 
exposures of connected banks.  
7.2 No Increase in Rate of Return Required by Depositors 
A body of evidence suggests that depositors (both insured and uninsured) respond to changes 
in bank risk (e.g., Hannan and Hanweck, 1988; Cook and Spellman, 1994; Berger and Turk-
Ariss, 2015; Danisewicz et al., 2017).27, 28 But if risk-shifting to taxpayers occurs, as measured 
by IPP, it implies that discipline imposed by debtholders is insufficient to offset banks’ 
incentives to increase risk. We provide support for this assertion by showing that depositors 
                                                             
27 Hanna and Hanweck (1998) and Cook and Spellman (1994) show that insured and uninsured Certificate of 
Deposits issued by US banks reflect the bank’s riskiness. Berger and Turk-Ariss (2015) show that depositor 
discipline was present in the US prior to the crisis. Danisewicz et al. (2017) uncover that both insured and 
uninsured depositors respond to changes in the priority of their claims on a bank’s assets. 
28 Broadly, this relates to the extensive literature on market discipline. See Flannery and Bliss (2019) for an 
excellent review. 
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(both insured and uninsured) do not increase their required rate of returns when banks establish 
connections to the Fed.  
 Because deposits of less than $100,000 were insured before the year 2008 (the limit was 
increased to $250,000 in October 2008), we use the 3, 6 and 12-month interest rates offered on 
Certificate of Deposits with a nominal value of $10,000 as proxies for the rate of return required 
on insured deposits (3, 6, 12mthCD%(10k), Columns (1) to (6) of Table 8).29 In addition, we 
also use the total interest expense on all time deposits below $100,000 scaled by total time 
deposits below $100,000 (Int. Exp. Time Depo.<100k, Columns (7) to (8)). As a proxy for the 
rate of return required on uninsured deposits, we use the total interest expense on time deposits 
above $100,000 scaled by total time deposits above $100,000 (Int. Exp. Time Depo.>100k 
Columns (9) to (10)). We restrict the analysis for uninsured deposits to years before 2009 before 
the limit was increased to $250,000. Unfortunately, we do not have interest rates on CDs that 
are above $100,000 throughout our sample period. Finally, to capture the total interest expense 
paid on all funds (deposits and non-deposits), we use Total Int. Exp defined as the total interest 
expense scaled by total liabilities in Columns (11) to (12). 
 < INSERT TABLE 8 HERE > 
It is quite clear from results displayed in both Panel A (connections gain) and Panel B 
(connections lost) of Table 8 that there is no relationship between the required rate of return on 
deposits (both insured and uninsured) and Fed connections. This supports our narrative that 
risk is shifted to the taxpayer. If increases in Fed connections lead to increases in riskiness for 
                                                             
29 We only have data on the rates offered for CDs with a nominal value of $10,000. The data is obtained from 
S&P Global.  
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depositors, they would require a higher rate of return on their deposits at connected banks.30 
Overall, our findings are consistent with the notion that risk at Fed connected banks is shifted 
to the taxpayer; despite undertaking riskier policies, debtholders (and shareholders) do not view 
connected banks as riskier.  
 
8. Additional Tests 
We conduct various additional tests which we produce in an Internet Appendix (IA). See 
Appendix A for details on the construction of the additional variables that we employ. Tables 
IA.1 to 3 use alternative proxies for connections to the Fed. Table IA.1 re-runs our analysis 
using gains (losses) in current connections to the Fed (Current Fed Gain (Loss)) rather than 
just a gain (loss) in all types (current and non-current) connections. We observe that risk-taking 
and shifting increases when a director obtains public service positions in the Fed. 
Unsurprisingly, stepping down from Fed positions does not lead to a decrease in risk-taking 
and shifting; bank directors would still have enduring connections that confers benefits brought 
upon by association with the Fed.  
Tables IA.2 and IA.3 estimate the effects of gains (and reductions) of public service 
connections established through the different roles that bank directors can undertake; Reserve 
                                                             
30 It is worth noting that even if we were to observe that debtholders increase their required rate of return in 
response to increases in Fed connections, this is not enough to conclude that risk-shifting to the taxpayer did not 
occur. The increase in interest require by debtholders could still not be enough to deter risk-shifting to the financial 
safety-net. The fact that we did not observe an increase is therefore stronger evidence that risk-shifting to the 
taxpayer increases at connected banks.  
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Bank directorships and advisory council positions, respectively. We continue to find largely 
similar results across both positions that directors can undertake at the Fed.  
Table IA.4 controls for other forms of connections between banks and supervisors. We 
control for revolving door connections of former regulators (e.g., Shive and Forster, 2017) (Ex-
Regulator Gain (Loss)), former politicians (e.g., Duchin and Sosyura, 2012) (Politician Gain 
(Loss)), and the amount banks spend on lobbying (e.g., Lambert, 2018) (Lobby%). We continue 
to find similar results.  
Table IA.5 controls for the effects of market discipline (e.g., Ashcraft, 2008). An 
alternative explanation for some of our findings is that increases in regulatory connections lead 
to less discipline exerted by market participants.31As proxies for creditor discipline we use 
subordinated debt (Sub Debt) and core deposits not typically covered by federal deposit 
insurance (Core Deposits). Our results remain robust even when controlling for market 
discipline. 
In Table IA.6, we include additional board characteristics that could be correlated with 
risk-taking and serving in the Fed, to alleviate additional concerns of omitted variables. For 
instance, boards that have directors who serve (or have served) in the Fed are likely to have 
higher ability or more be more diverse, which has also been shown to influence risk-taking. As 
controls for the composition of the board, we include the % of women on the board (e.g., Faccio 
et al., 2016), board age and qualifications (e.g., Berger et al., 2014), financial experts (e.g., 
Minton et al., 2014) and board seats (e.g., Fich and Shivdasani, 2006; Field et al., 2013) (Board 
                                                             
31  Note that this explanation is not necessary at odds with our interpretation of a reduction in supervisory 
effectiveness. If markets expect that regulators would bail out connected banks in times of crisis, they would 
monitor less stringently.  
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Female%, Board Age, Board Avg. Quals., Board Fin. Experts% and Board Avg. Seats). 
Comfortingly, our findings continue to hold. 
Table IA.7 includes other observable CEO characteristics that could be correlated with 
serving at the Fed. For instance, CEOs with better educational backgrounds could be more 
likely to serve, and, simultaneously, pursue riskier policies. We control for CEO educational 
quality and attainment (CEO MBA and CEO Ivy League UG) (e.g., King et al., 2016), age (e.g., 
Serfling 2014) (CEO Age), overconfidence (e.g., Ho et al., 2016) (CEO Overconfidence), 
whether the CEO was born in the great depression (e.g., Malmendier et al., 2011) (CEO 
Depression Baby), and whether the CEO started her career during a recession (e.g., Schoar and 
Zuo, 2017) (CEO Crisis Career Starter). We also control for compensation incentives of the 
CEO (CEO Log(Salary), CEO Log(Vega) and CEO Log(Delta)) as they could affect bank 
policies (e.g., Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). Our results remain quantitatively similar.  
Table IA.8 includes several county-level variables (religiosity, Herfindahl-Hirschman 
Index (HHI), unemployment rate, income per capita) to address concerns of omitted variables 
at the county level (e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2009; Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016; Bushman et al., 
2016). Our results continue to hold. Finally, the analysis in Tables IA.9 and IA.10 exclude the 
crisis years (2007-2008) and the worst performing banks, respectively. In each of these 
additional regressions, our results continue to hold. 
9. Conclusion 
This study investigates if connections established while bank directors hold public service 
positions in the Federal Reserve leads to regulatory capture, and subsequently, to banks 
accessing larger subsidies from the financial safety-net. We demonstrate that banks that gain 
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public service connections hold less capital for a given increase in risk than non-connected 
banks. As a result, these banks are able to shift risk to the financial safety-net and extract larger 
public subsidies. We also show that although connected banks undertake riskier business 
models, such banks are not viewed as riskier by equity investors and debtholders. The latter 
finding supports a risk-shifting narrative where taxpayers (rather than equity investors or 
debtholders) absorb some of the risk exposures of connected banks. 
Our study draws attention to the darker side of interactions between regulators and bank 
directors and has two main policy implications. First, while our approach may not be able to 
unambiguous establish causality, or pinpoint the immediate channel through which connections 
facilitate risk-shifting, our investigation still highlights an important issue. At a minimum, we 
document robust correlations which demonstrate that, irrespective of the exact channel(s) at 
play, connections between regulators and bankers warrant more scrutiny. That is, even if the 
relationship between connections and risk-shifting were not causal, the documented 
relationship is statistically robust and has a clear implication: connected banks require 
additional scrutiny to prevent costly risk-shifting to the financial safety net.  
Second, the fact that connected banks can shift risk on the back of connections 
established through public service roles—which carry no formal decision-making powers over 
matters of supervision or enforcement—is particularity notable. It suggests that attempts to 
tackle the risk-shifting effects we show, by further restrictions on the remit of bank directors, 
are unlikely to be effective in reducing gains to banks from connections with the Fed. Instead, 
questions are justified over whether the time-honored practice of granting banks a privileged 
role in the governance of the Fed, that are presumably intended to improve rather than 
undermine regulatory oversight, should continue. 
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This table contains summary statistics of key variables (Panel A to C) and description of the public service positions bank directors undertaken 
while at the Federal Reserve (Panel D). Refer to Appendix A for construction and definition of these variables. The sample period is 2001 to 
2013. N is the number of bank-year observations, p1 and p99 are the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel A show summary statistics of the variables 
used in this study. Panel B and C presents more detailed summary statistics on Federal Reserve connections. Panel D shows the public service 
positions that bank directors have or is currently serving at the Federal Reserve.  
                
Panel A: Summary Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
N mean Std. Dev. p1 p50 p99 
Connection variables 
Fed Gain 2359 0.035 0.183 0 0 1 
Fed Loss 2539 0.023 0.149 0 0 1 
Current Fed Gain 2359 0.03 0.17 0 0 1 
Current Fed Loss 2359 0.029 0.167 0 0 1 
Fed Directorship Gain 2359 0.025 0.154 0 0 1 
Fed Directorship Loss 2359 0.017 0.128 0 0 1 
Fed Advisory Gain 2359 0.016 0.125 0 0 1 
Fed Advisory Loss 2359 0.011 0.103 0 0 1 
Ex-Regulator Gain 2359 0.009 0.098 0 0 0 
Ex-Regulator Loss 2359 0.004 0.063 0 0 0 
Politician Gain 2359 0.018 0.013 0 0 1 
Politician Loss 2359 0.014 0.117 0 0 1        
Financial variables (used and described in Appendix B) 
σE 2539 0.314 0.236 0.072 0.237 1.345 
E (millions) 2539 4378 21467 8.4 290.1 137404.6 
B (millions) 2539 34102 192724 306.2 2100 1233109 
V (millions) 2539 37396 205806 334.7 2351.5 1373484        
Financial variables 
IPP 2539 0.323 1.218 0 0.001 5.118 
B/V 2539 90.289 6.753 73.627 90.178 103.285 
σv 2539 3.323 2.595 0.567 2.799 12.553 
Log Total Assets 2539 6.528 0.689 5.535 6.363 9.131 
ROA 2539 0.005 0.014 -0.059 0.008 0.021 
Total Deposits 2539 0.757 0.089 0.464 0.774 0.898 
Tier-1 Capital 2539 0.09 0.025 0.046 0.088 0.149 
Sub Debt 2539 0.042 0.087 0 0 0.344 
Core Deposits 2487 0.788 0.13 0.259 0.82 0.955 
Total Loans 2539 0.672 0.123 0.317 0.689 0.89 
Bad Loans 2539 0.014 0.017 0 0.008 0.081 
Market Risk 2539 0.109 0.175 -0.37 0.106 0.53 
σStock Rets. 2539 2.761 1.822 0.852 2.108 9.091 
Tail Risk 2539 5.82 3.727 1.695 4.542 18.572 
∆Loans 2359 0.003 0.004 -0.016 0.003 0.036 
∆Bad Loans 2529 0.03 0.148 -0.212 0.008 0.498 
∆RWA 2359 0.004 0.009 -0.156 0.004 0.034 
∆NI Income  2359 0.003 0.014 -0.025 0 0.041 
σROA 1765 -6.879 1.205 -8.976 -7.078 -4.084 
        
Board variables 
Board Size 2539 11.846 3.343 6 11 21 
Board Independence 2539 0.789 0.112 0.5 0.813 0.933 
CEO Tenure 2539 6.752 6.067 0 4.9 26.9 
CEO Duality   2539 0.496 0.5 0 0 1 
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Panel B: Federal Reserve connections summary statistics # bank-years with #Fed Public Service Bank Directors 
  
 0 1 2 3 4 
# Bank Directors with Fed Public Service experience 2189 629 141 43 9 
# Bank Directors with Fed Directorship Public Service experience 2317 493 101 42 4 
# Bank Directors with Fed Advisory Council Public Service experience 2697 293 21 0 0 
      
 
Panel C: Federal Reserve connections gain and lost summary statistics by year        
Year: 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 
# Banks that gain Fed Connections (Fed Gain)  5 6 4 11 11 8 5 5 7 15 5 6 
# Banks that lost Fed Connections (Fed Loss)   1 2 3 4 7 9 5 7 6 4 6 3 
# Banks with at least 1 Fed Public Service Dir. 39 44 45 70 75 68 68 68 64 68 49 58 
# Banks 87 101 98 258 285 287 275 267 255 233 215 178 
             
   
Panel D: Titles of Federal Reserve Bank Public Service positions in our dataset 
 
Position Position Served in: 
Director (Reserve Bank Directorship 
Position) Reserve Bank Board of directors 
  
Advisor (Advisory Council Position) 
Federal Advisory Council, New England Advisory Council, Community Depository Institution Advisory Council, 
Business and Community Advisory Council, Industry Councils Committee, Economic Advisory Council, Business 
Advisory Council, Small Business Advisory Council, Small Business and Agriculture Advisory Council, US Treasury 
and the Foreign Exchange Committee, International Advisory Committee, Investors Advisory Committee on Financial 
Markets, Community Depository Advisory Council, Community Bank Advisory Council, Small Bank Advisory 
Council, Labor, Education and Healthcare Advisory Council, Agriculture, Small Business and Labor Advisory Council, 





Table 2: Bank Risk-Taking: Sensitivity of Leverage to Risk at Fed Connected Banks 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V) to portfolio risk (σv) at Fed connected banks. The 
sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: (B/V)i,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and 
year respectively. (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, σv is asset volatility, Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number 
of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls is the vector of variables in each column. Refer to Appendix A for description of 
variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V) and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level 
and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant and level term for the control variables for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V 
             
Fed Gain x σv 0.680*** 0.872** 0.603** 0.721** 0.571*** 0.830**       
 [3.768] [2.503] [2.538] [2.265] [2.913] [2.520]       
Fed Loss x σv       -0.646*** -0.831*** -1.041*** -0.808*** -0.917*** -0.837*** 
       [-3.678] [-4.054] [-6.242] [-3.657] [-6.036] [-4.202] 
σv -0.188* -12.150** -8.549** -14.300*** -9.412** -14.316*** -0.084 -13.864*** -10.243*** -15.961*** -11.110*** -16.032*** 
 [-1.663] [-2.432] [-2.267] [-2.817] [-2.456] [-2.786] [-0.784] [-3.413] [-3.351] [-3.765] [-3.533] [-3.832] 
Tier-1 Capital x σv  -0.845 -0.659 -1.358 -0.834 -0.933  0.14 -1.197 -0.537 -1.316 0.014 
  [-0.558] [-0.299] [-0.846] [-0.395] [-0.632]  [0.098] [-0.435] [-0.366] [-0.517] [0.010] 
Bad Loans x σv  20.014*** 14.237*** 18.586*** 12.376*** 20.161***  20.276*** 14.750*** 19.124*** 12.987*** 20.490*** 
  [5.321] [5.259] [4.676] [4.783] [5.551]  [5.238] [5.671] [4.981] [5.578] [5.524] 
ROA x σv  3.098 3.377 4.48 3.617 3.311  4.095 4.605** 5.567 4.892** 4.287 
  [0.716] [1.219] [1.020] [1.325] [0.792]  [1.107] [2.079] [1.492] [2.289] [1.200] 
Total Deposits x σv  1.246 0.577 1.301 1.070* 1.133  1.973* 1.212 1.934* 1.800** 1.819* 
  [1.489] [1.006] [1.370] [1.718] [1.389]  [1.810] [1.446] [1.725] [2.129] [1.736] 
Log Total Assets x σv  2.312* 1.704* 2.969** 1.894* 2.908**  2.359** 1.817** 3.052*** 1.983** 2.974*** 
  [1.774] [1.754] [2.253] [1.896] [2.142]  [2.228] [2.438] [2.804] [2.575] [2.712] 
Log Total Assets Sq x σv  -0.129 -0.095 -0.170* -0.106 -0.172*  -0.119 -0.091* -0.165** -0.101* -0.164** 
  [-1.409] [-1.400] [-1.842] [-1.507] [-1.788]  [-1.621] [-1.821] [-2.195] [-1.940] [-2.142] 
Total Loans x σv  -0.016 0.316 0.033 0.165 0.034  -0.098 0.293 -0.039 0.16 -0.052 
  [-0.026] [0.718] [0.051] [0.365] [0.059]  [-0.163] [0.753] [-0.061] [0.381] [-0.091] 
Board Size x σv  -0.036 -0.037** -0.049* -0.025 -0.028  -0.044* -0.046*** -0.058** -0.036** -0.036 
  [-1.445] [-2.021] [-1.865] [-1.347] [-1.113]  [-1.856] [-2.718] [-2.395] [-2.179] [-1.485] 
Board Independence x σv  1.412** 0.971** 1.256** 0.69 1.519***  2.114*** 1.623*** 1.920*** 1.357*** 2.205*** 
  [2.451] [2.020] [2.128] [1.397] [2.714]  [3.597] [3.425] [3.212] [2.831] [3.860] 
CEO Tenure x σv  0.002 0.004 0.008 0.008 0.004  0.008 0.009 0.014 0.015 0.01 
  [0.178] [0.483] [0.612] [0.994] [0.374]  [0.554] [0.919] [0.914] [1.399] [0.694] 
CEO Duality x σv  -0.139 0.044 -0.259 -0.044 -0.13  -0.164 -0.001 -0.281* -0.076 -0.153 
  [-0.854] [0.370] [-1.592] [-0.407] [-0.826]  [-0.930] [-0.007] [-1.680] [-0.693] [-0.904] 
Market Risk x σv  -1.331*** -1.018*** -1.121*** -0.853*** -1.369***  -1.411*** -1.049*** -1.164*** -0.870*** -1.446*** 
  [-3.548] [-4.010] [-2.992] [-3.217] [-3.701]  [-3.493] [-3.839] [-2.946] [-3.129] [-3.664] 
             
Bank Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Bank FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes 
State-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Regulator-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.606 0.731 0.764 0.747 0.799 0.737 0.597 0.726 0.764 0.745 0.799 0.733 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 




















Risk-shifting to the Safety-net: Sensitivity of IPP to Risk at Fed Connected Banks 
This table reports estimates of Equation (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of the value of public subsidies (IPP) to portfolio risk (σv) at Fed 
connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: (IPP)i,t = β0 + β1σVi,t + β2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + β3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i 
and t indexes bank and year respectively. IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility, Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the 
number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls is the vector of variables in each column. Refer to Appendix A for description 
of variables and Appendix B for the construction of IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term β2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level 
and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant and level term for the control variables for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
             
Fed Gain x σv 0.318*** 0.352*** 0.301*** 0.324*** 0.283*** 0.349***       
 [4.688] [3.076] [3.338] [2.854] [3.249] [3.098]       
Fed Loss x σv       -0.282*** -0.223*** -0.399*** -0.216*** -0.400*** -0.220*** 
       [-6.121] [-2.985] [-6.553] [-2.861] [-6.738] [-2.979] 
σv 0.272*** -1.053 -1.222 -1.574 -1.637 -1.241 0.320*** -1.724 -2.067 -2.329* -2.520* -1.937 
 [6.222] [-0.621] [-0.691] [-0.937] [-0.946] [-0.715] [7.396] [-1.239] [-1.516] [-1.678] [-1.854] [-1.351] 
Tier-1 Capital x σv  0.949** -0.415 0.873* -0.293 0.896**  1.338*** -0.673 1.246*** -0.521 1.281*** 
  [2.172] [-0.457] [1.933] [-0.299] [2.026]  [3.344] [-0.607] [3.320] [-0.464] [3.164] 
Bad Loans x σv  5.367*** 4.583*** 5.295*** 4.456*** 5.391***  5.247*** 4.623*** 5.270*** 4.664*** 5.272*** 
  [5.184] [4.285] [4.711] [3.710] [5.265]  [4.593] [4.424] [4.666] [4.396] [4.660] 
ROA x σv  0.732 0.689 0.894 0.755 0.777  1.064 1.234 1.287 1.369* 1.106 
  [0.641] [0.631] [0.735] [0.662] [0.687]  [1.197] [1.534] [1.391] [1.661] [1.250] 
Total Deposits x σv  0.26 0.441* 0.258 0.441* 0.235  0.596* 0.791** 0.597* 0.820** 0.570* 
  [1.198] [1.870] [1.092] [1.710] [1.091]  [1.707] [2.244] [1.651] [2.194] [1.660] 
Log Total Assets x σv  0.177 0.188 0.325 0.297 0.233  0.183 0.241 0.355 0.348 0.247 
  [0.384] [0.391] [0.713] [0.635] [0.492]  [0.499] [0.683] [1.003] [1.015] [0.654] 
Log Total Assets Sq x σv  -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.013 -0.011  -0.002 -0.005 -0.013 -0.011 -0.007 
  [-0.203] [-0.195] [-0.491] [-0.397] [-0.319]  [-0.074] [-0.193] [-0.536] [-0.471] [-0.248] 
Total Loans x σv  -0.044 0.032 -0.097 -0.007 -0.033  -0.054 0.037 -0.104 0.005 -0.044 
  [-0.319] [0.196] [-0.643] [-0.037] [-0.240]  [-0.367] [0.252] [-0.651] [0.033] [-0.298] 
Board Size x σv  -0.010* -0.008 -0.01 -0.008 -0.009  -0.013** -0.012** -0.014** -0.013** -0.012** 
  [-1.674] [-1.341] [-1.642] [-1.159] [-1.554]  [-2.365] [-2.231] [-2.452] [-2.237] [-2.213] 
Board Independence x σv  0.174 0.261 0.2 0.268 0.188  0.427*** 0.556*** 0.464** 0.588*** 0.441*** 
  [1.239] [1.574] [1.310] [1.476] [1.346]  [2.606] [3.202] [2.584] [3.156] [2.690] 
CEO Tenure x σv  0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.001  0.004 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.004 
  [0.372] [0.538] [0.877] [1.126] [0.450]  [0.788] [1.048] [1.136] [1.542] [0.831] 
CEO Duality x σv  0.005 0.022 -0.01 0.004 0.004  -0.003 0.005 -0.017 -0.011 -0.003 
  [0.106] [0.440] [-0.228] [0.080] [0.085]  [-0.056] [0.099] [-0.354] [-0.251] [-0.061] 
Market Risk x σv  -0.286*** -0.369*** -0.286** -0.363*** -0.287***  -0.328*** -0.393*** -0.319** -0.375*** -0.330*** 
  [-2.735] [-3.780] [-2.583] [-3.402] [-2.761]  [-2.640] [-3.811] [-2.508] [-3.517] [-2.675] 
             
Bank Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Bank FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No No No No Yes No No No No No Yes 
State-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Regulator-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.533 0.742 0.762 0.74 0.764 0.744 0.497 0.711 0.751 0.712 0.756 0.713 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
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Table 4 
DiD Analysis: Reserve Bank Retirements as Shocks to Connections 
This table reports summary statistics (Panel A), the year of Reserve Bank President retirements (Panel B) and estimates (Panel C and D) of 
the difference-in-difference (DiD) estimation (with different specifications) as described in Equation (7) and examines the sensitivity of 
leverage (B/V) and the value of public subsidies (IPP) to σv at treated banks compared to a group of control banks following shocks to the 
efficacy of Fed public service connections. The sample period is from 2001 to 2013. The DiD analysis is carried out over an unbalanced 5-
year window (t-2, t-1, t, t+1 and t+2) where t is the year of Fed Reserve President retirements (7 shocks). Post is a dummy variable that is = 
1 for years t to t+2 and 0 otherwise. We define banks to be in the treatment group (Treated = 1) if banks: 1) have at least one director with Fed 
public service experience through the 5-year DiD window; 2) the Fed public service position held by the director overlaps with the tenure and 
Fed district of the outgoing Reserve Bank President. Banks in the control group (Treated = 0) are banks that do not have any directors with 
Fed public service experience in the 5-year DiD window and are in the district of the outgoing Reserve Bank President. Panel A reports 
difference in means (and p-values) of the characteristics of treated and control banks in the pre-shock (t-1) year. Panel B show the year of 
Reserve Bank President retirements. Panel C presents estimates of the DiD regression: Yi,k,t = β0 + β1σVi,k,t + β2Treatedi,k,t + β3Postk,t + β4 
Treatedi,k,t x Postk,t + β5Treatedi,k,t x σVi,k,t + β6Postk,t x σVi,k,t + β7Treatedi,k,t x Postk,t x σVi,k,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t  where i indexes bank, k indexes 
Fed Districts and t indexes year. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(5) and IPP in Columns (6)-(10). (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by 
market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt and σv is asset volatility. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, 
Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO 
Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv x Post. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B 
for the construction of B/V, IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient β7(Treatedi,k,t x Postk,t x σVi,k,t). Panel D report estimates of a 
dynamic timing model. Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant 





         
Panel A: Summary statistics      
Variables Pre-Shock Treated Fed 
Public Service 
Pre-Shock Control Difference in Means 
# Treated 
Banks 
Mean # Control  Mean (Treatment - Control) 
      
∆IPP 26 0.03 88 0.12 -0.09 
∆B/V 26 1.34 88 0.53 0.81 
∆σv 26 -0.02 88 0.02 -0.04 
σv 26 3.35 88 3.12 0.23 
 Bad Loans 26 0.007 88 0.009 -0.002 
ROA 26 0.01 88 0.008 0.002 
Total Deposits 26 0.72 88 0.75 -0.03 
Market Risk 26 0.15 88 0.12 0.03 
Tier1 Capital 26 0.079 88 0.085 -0.006* 
Total Assets 26 6.99 88 6.46 0.53*** 
Total Loans 26 0.66 88 0.71 -0.05* 
Board Size 26 13.4 88 11.8 1.6** 
Board Independence 26 0.78 88 0.77 0.01 
CEO Tenure 26 8.2 88 7.2 1 
CEO Duality 26 0.80 88 0.52 0.28*** 
 
    
Panel B: Reserve Bank President Retirements Year of Retirement 
  
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, District 2 2003 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, District 5 2004 
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, District 12 2004 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, District 6 2006 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, District 7 2007 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, District 8 2008 





Panel C: diff-in-diff (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
           
Treated x Post x σv -0.892** -0.356 -1.113** -1.916*** -1.016** -0.234** -0.152** -0.240** -0.312*** -0.185*** 
 [-2.518] [-1.098] [-2.594] [-3.165] [-2.268] [-2.497] [-2.494] [-2.096] [-2.850] [-4.220] 
Treated x σv 0.11 -0.172 0.073 1.205*** 0.519 -0.124* -0.038 -0.134 0.003 -0.002 
 [0.360] [-0.667] [0.233] [3.313] [1.453] [-1.711] [-0.793] [-1.607] [0.077] [-0.053] 
Post x σv 0.657*** 1.787 0.766*** 0.988*** -12.284 0.165** -5.606*** 0.222** 0.195* -4.353*** 
 [3.141] [0.197] [2.671] [2.624] [-1.070] [2.299] [-3.226] [2.510] [1.931] [-2.960] 
σv -0.809*** -14.014** -0.766*** -1.915*** -17.093* 0.097 -1.056 0.063 -0.017 -0.926 
 [-4.744] [-2.193] [-2.975] [-7.847] [-1.719] [1.623] [-1.057] [0.768] [-0.867] [-1.517] 
Treated x Post 1.386 0.323 2.927* 5.194** 3.028* 0.507 0.442* 0.74 0.771** 0.513*** 
 [1.077] [0.277] [1.898] [2.555] [1.974] [1.572] [1.956] [1.591] [2.234] [3.163] 
Post -2.637*** -19.492 -1.802* -3.957*** 36.975 -0.690** 10.963** -0.655 -0.527* 9.684** 
 [-3.070] [-0.703] [-1.795] [-3.028] [1.036] [-2.494] [2.445] [-1.619] [-1.660] [2.290] 
           
Bank Controls x Post x σv No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
State-Year FE No No Yes No No No No Yes No No 
Regulator-Year FE No No Yes No No No No Yes No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.721 0.865 0.789 0.645 0.827 0.416 0.895 0.464 0.325 0.876 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 











Panel D: Dynamic Timing (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
           
Treated x Postt-1 x σv 0.403 0.147 0.204 -0.012 1.035 0.029 -0.035 0.014 -0.054 0.005 
 [0.849] [0.187] [0.349] [-0.021] [0.884] [0.572] [-0.465] [0.237] [-0.998] [0.120] 
Treated x Postt x σv -0.705 -0.247 -0.72 -1.679*** -0.041 -0.03 -0.144 -0.06 -0.131* -0.102 
 [-1.383] [-0.288] [-1.178] [-2.704] [-0.035] [-0.395] [-1.457] [-0.530] [-1.928] [-1.454] 
Treated x Postt+1 x σv -0.177 0.373 -0.373 -1.102 0.504 -0.051 -0.036 -0.076 -0.119 0.016 
 [-0.325] [0.459] [-0.575] [-1.558] [0.422] [-0.588] [-0.314] [-0.667] [-1.338] [0.179] 
Treated x Postt+2 x σv -0.967 -0.271 -1.571* -2.357*** -0.3 -0.431*** -0.350*** -0.458** -0.535*** -0.274*** 
 [-1.539] [-0.332] [-1.906] [-3.253] [-0.241] [-2.845] [-2.944] [-2.360] [-3.253] [-2.996] 
           
Bank Controls x Dynamic Timeline x σv No Yes No No Yes No Yes No No Yes 
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
State-Year FE No No Yes No No No No Yes No No 
Regulator-Year FE No No Yes No No No No Yes No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.742 0.885 0.803 0.671 0.822 0.514 0.921 0.553 0.461 0.9 
Observations 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 552 










The effects of EESA on Risk-Taking and Risk-Shifting at Connected Banks 
This table reports the results of estimates of Equation (8) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of 
public subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks, following the enactment of the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (Panel A) and for Fed connected banks 
which were bailed out during the crisis (Panel B). The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression in Panel A: Yi,t = β0 + β1σVi,t + β2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + β3Post-Crisist + 
β4(Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x Post-Crisist + β5Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + β6Post-Crisist  x σVi,t +  β7Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x Post-Crisist x σVi,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t and Yi,t = β0 + β1σVi,t + β2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + CPPi,t 
+ β4(Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x CPPi,t + β5Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + β6CPPi,t  x σVi,t +  β7Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x CPPi,t  x σVi,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in 
Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility, Post-Crisis 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years 2008-2013 and 0 otherwise, CPP is a dummy variable that equals 1 for years 2008-2013 for banks that have received TARP bailout funds and Fed Gain (Loss) 
is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls 
include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction 
of these variables with σv x Post-Crisis. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of B/V, IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction 
term β7 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t  x Post-Crisist  x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Post-EESA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x Post-Crisis08-13 x σv 1.396*** 1.109*** 1.250**    0.321*** 0.258*** 0.313***    
 [3.064] [3.190] [2.561] 
   [3.642] [2.950] [3.550]    
Fed Loss x Post-Crisis08-13 x σv    -1.482*** -0.637** -1.335***    -0.274*** -0.405*** -0.267*** 
 
   [-3.805] [-2.408] [-3.304]    [-4.559] [-6.910] [-4.432] 
CPP08-13 x σv 0.218 0.216** 0.214 0.308* 0.268* 0.301* 0.073* 0.071* 0.072* 0.107* 0.098* 0.106* 
 [1.489] [2.037] [1.496] [1.661] [1.952] [1.682] [1.670] [1.702] [1.667] [1.774] [1.745] [1.781] 
Post-Crisis08-13 x σv -0.08 3.64 6.532 -0.519 3.28 5.373 -1.256 -0.592 -0.787 -2.104 -1.391 -1.734 
 [-0.011] [0.523] [0.816] [-0.069] [0.477] [0.632] [-0.673] [-0.314] [-0.455] [-1.418] [-0.895] [-1.229] 
σv -10.636 -10.856 -18.993** -12.540* -12.319* -20.223** 0.108 -0.007 -0.604* 0.118 -0.072 -0.535 
 [-1.474] [-1.541] [-2.262] [-1.774] [-1.852] [-2.412] [1.016] [-0.009] [-1.661] [1.075] [-0.090] [-1.534] 
 
            
Bank Controls x Post-Crisis08-13 x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.773 0.791 0.778 0.77 0.79 0.776 0.775 0.794 0.777 0.758 0.787 0.761 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
 
            
 
 52 
                          
Panel B: Post-Bailout (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x CPP08-13 x σv 1.632*** 1.249*** 1.446***    0.378*** 0.316*** 0.364***    
 [4.091] [4.214] [3.498]    [4.190] [3.599] [4.075]    
Fed Loss x CPP08-13 x σv    -0.942*** -0.473* -0.774*    -0.340*** -0.346*** -0.326*** 
 
   [-5.234] [-1.817] [-1.806]    [-5.545] [-4.869] [-5.259] 
CPP08-13 x σv 0.191 0.198* 0.191 0.317* 0.272** 0.309* 0.066 0.066 0.066 0.110* 0.102* 0.109* 
 [1.311] [1.880] [1.333] [1.710] [1.975] [1.718] [1.528] [1.583] [1.529] [1.827] [1.807] [1.833] 
σv -10.299 -10.775 -18.576** -11.654* -12.209* -19.441** 0.177 0.057 -0.516 0.114 -0.051 -0.511 
 [-1.387] [-1.519] [-2.154] [-1.695] [-1.854] [-2.387] [1.451] [0.072] [-1.345] [0.996] [-0.063] [-1.493] 
 
            
Bank Controls x Post-Crisis08-13 x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.774 0.792 0.779 0.769 0.79 0.775 0.777 0.795 0.779 0.759 0.788 0.762 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
 















Fed Connected Banks and Balance Sheet Risk 
This table reports estimates of using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines bank balance sheet risk at Fed connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We 
estimate the following regression: Yi,t = β0 +β1Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is σROA (measured as (Log (Rolling standard deviation of ROA 
of the bank for the ahead 8 quarters)) in Columns (1)-(2), ∆Loans (measured as (Log Total Nominal Loans – Lag Log Total Nominal Loans)/(Lag Total Nominal Loans)) in Columns (3)-(4), ∆Bad Loans 
(measured as (Log Total Nominal Bad Loans – Lag Log Total Nominal Bad Loans)/(Lag Total Nominal Bad Loans)) in Columns (5)-(6), ∆RWA (measured as (Log Total Nominal RWA – Lag Log Total 
Nominal RWA)/(Lag Log Total Nominal RWA)) in Columns (7)-(8) and ∆NI Income (measured as (Log Total Nominal Non-Interest Income – Lag Log Total Nominal Non-Interest Income)/(Lag Log Total 
Nominal Non-Interest Income)) in Columns (9)-(10).  Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service 
experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Estimations of results with Fed Gain (Loss) are displayed in Panel A and B respectively. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, 
Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to 
Appendix A for description of variable. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the term β1 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
Panel A: Connection Gain (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 σROA σROA ∆Loans ∆Loans ∆Bad Loans ∆Bad Loans ∆RWA ∆RWA ∆NI Income ∆NI Income 
           
Fed Gain 0.247** 0.163 0.003** 0.002* 0.028* 0.032* 0.003** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.003** 
 [2.315] [1.585] [2.388] [1.866] [1.801] [1.944] [2.419] [2.168] [2.688] [2.427] 
           
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.451 0.454 0.27 0.349 0.131 0.122 0.282 0.364 0.528 0.593 
Observations 1,765 1,765 2,539 2,539 2,529 2,529 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
                      
Panel B: Connection Loss (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 σROA σROA ∆Loans ∆Loans ∆Bad Loans ∆Bad Loans ∆RWA ∆RWA ∆NI Income ∆NI Income 
           
Fed Loss -0.441*** -0.410*** -0.004** -0.001 -0.016** -0.016** -0.003** -0.001 -0.002* -0.001 
 [-3.738] [-3.534] [-1.994] [-0.973] [-2.509] [-2.208] [-1.996] [-0.953] [-1.874] [-0.924] 
           
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.453 0.458 0.271 0.348 0.13 0.121 0.282 0.363 0.526 0.592 





Fed Connected Banks and Market Risk 
This table reports estimates using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines bank market risk at Fed connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the 
following regression: Yi,t = β0 +β1Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is Tail Risk (measured as the negative of the average return on the BHC’s 
stock during the worst 5% trading days for the BHC over the year) in Columns (1)-(2) and (5)-(6), σStock Rets. (measured as the standard deviation of the daily stock returns of the BHC’s stock over the 
year) in Columns (3)-(4) and (7)-(8). Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the 
Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO 
Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix A for description of variable. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the term β1 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t). 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Tail Risk Tail Risk σStock Rets σStock Rets Tail Risk Tail Risk σStock Rets σStock Rets 
         
Fed Gain -0.129 -0.252 -0.047 -0.087     
 [-0.763] [-1.468] [-0.536] [-0.975]     
Fed Loss     0.103 0.058 0.042 0.001 
     [0.403] [0.296] [0.366] [0.006] 
         
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.769 0.795 0.726 0.755 0.769 0.795 0.726 0.755 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
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Table 8 
Fed Connected Banks and Deposit Rates 
This table examines bank deposit rates at Fed connected banks using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications). The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: 
Yi,t = β0 +β1Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is 3(6, 12)mthCD% (interest rates required on 3 (6, 12) month Certificate of Deposits on $10,000) 
in Columns (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), Int. Exp. Time Depo. <100k (measured as the Total Interest Expense on Time Deposits below $100,000 / Total Time Deposits below $100,000) in Columns (7)-(8), 
Int. Exp. Time Depo. >100k (measured as the Total Interest Expense on Time Deposits above $100,000 / Total Time Deposits above $100,000) in Columns (9)-(10) and Total Int. Exp. (measured as the 
Total Interest Expense / Total Liabilities) in Columns (11)-(12). Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public 
service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Estimations of results with Fed Gain (Loss) are displayed in Panel A and B respectively. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, 
ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to 
Appendix A for description of variable. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the term β1 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. 
We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
                          
Panel A: Connection Gain (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 3mthCD% 3mthCD% 6mthCD% 6mthCD% 12mthCD% 12mthCD% Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Total Total 
 (10K) (10K) (10K) (10K) (10K) (10K) Time Depo. Time Depo. Time Depo. Time Depo. Int. Int. 
             <100k <100k >100k >100k Exp. Exp 
 
            
Fed Gain -0.035 -0.005 -0.054 -0.015 -0.058 -0.022 -1.325 -4.938 -0.061 0.095 0.00 0.011 
 [-0.616] [-0.082] [-1.001] [-0.256] [-0.965] [-0.359] [-0.774] [-1.224] [-0.418] [0.820] [0.022] [1.291] 
 
            
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.849 0.876 0.887 0.911 0.904 0.925 0.0783 0.0081 0.0176 0.0266 0.815 0.912 
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,192 1,192 1,200 1,200 2,539 2,539 1,391 1,391 2,539 2,539 
 











                          
Panel B: Connection Loss (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 3mthCD% 3mthCD% 6mthCD% 6mthCD% 12mthCD% 12mthCD% Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Int. Exp. Total Total 
 






Depo. Int. Int. 
             <100k <100k >100k >100k Exp. Exp. 
 
            
Fed Lost 0.002 -0.009 0.051 -0.002 -0.018 -0.009 -3.777 -2.07 -0.185 0.007 0.025 0 
 [0.018] [-0.098] [0.537] [-0.016] [-0.230] [-0.098] [-1.565] [-0.947] [-0.671] [0.032] [0.792] [0.560] 
 
            
Bank Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Bank FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Adj. R-squared 0.849 0.876 0.887 0.911 0.904 0.876 0.0792 0.00454 0.0176 0.0266 0.815 0.912 
Observations 1,130 1,130 1,192 1,192 1,200 1,130 2,539 2,539 1,391 1,391 2,539 2,539 




















Variable Definitions and Sources 
 
Variable Name Definition Source(s) 
Connection Variables   
Fed Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with 
public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise 
Various 
Current Fed Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board that 
is currently serving in public service positions at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise 
Various 
Fed Directorship Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with 
Reserve Bank Directorship experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise 
Various 
Fed Advisory Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with 
Federal Reserve Advisory Council experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise 
Various 
Ex-Regulator Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with 
non-public service experience at any regulatory agency and 0 if otherwise 
Various 
Politician Gain (Loss) Dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board who 
were politicians and 0 if otherwise. A politician is defined as having been Congressman (US Senators and US 
House Representatives), Deputy Secretary/Secretary of US Departments, US State Lieutenant 
Governors/Governors or US City Mayors) 
Various 
Lobby% (Amount spent on lobbying / Total Assets) in % Center for Responsive 
Politics 
Financial Variables   
IPP% Fair value of the deposit insurance premium in % as described in Appendix B CRSP, FR Y9-C 
σv% Volatility of asset returns (annualized) in % as described in Appendix B  CRSP, FR Y9-C 
(B/V)% (Book value of Liabilities / Market value of Assets) in % FR Y9-C 
Tier-1 Capital Tier-1 Capital / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Bad Loans Sum of loans past due 90 days or more and nonaccrual loans / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
ROA Return on Assets defined as the Income before extraordinary items / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Total Deposits Total Deposits / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Log Total Assets Natural logarithm of the book value of Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Log Total Assets Sq Square of (Log Total Assets) FR Y9-C 
Total Loans Total Loans / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Core Deposits (Core Deposits / Total Assets). Core Deposits include deposits held in domestic offices of the subsidiaries of 
the bank, excluding all time deposits of over $100,000 USD and any brokered deposits 
FR Y9-C 
Sub Debt Book value of Subordinated debt / (Subordinated debt + Tier-1 Capital) FR Y9-C 
Market Risk (Short term interest earning assets - Short term interest earning liabilities) / Total Assets FR Y9-C 
Tail Risk Negative of the average return on the BHC’s stock during the worst 5% trading days for the BHC over the year FR Y9-C 
3(6, 12)mthCD%(10k) Interest rate (in %) offered on $10,000 Certificate of Deposits with a maturity of 3 (6, 12) months S&P Global 
Int. Exp. Time Deposits<100k Interest expense paid on total time deposits of less than $100,000 / Total time deposits that are less than 
$100,000 
FR Y9-C 
Int. Exp. Time Deposits>100k Interest expense paid on total time deposits of more than $100,000 / Total time deposits that are more than 
$100,000 
FR Y9-C 
Total Int. Exp. Total interest expense / Total liabilities FR Y9-C 
σStock Rets. Standard deviation of the daily stock returns of the BHC’s stock over the year FR Y9-C 
σROA Log (Rolling standard deviation of ROA of the BHC for the ahead 8 quarters) FR Y9-C 
∆Loans (Log Total Nominal Loans – Lag Log Total Nominal Loans)/ (Lag Log Total Nominal Loans) FR Y9-C 
∆Bad Loans (Log Total Nominal Bad Loans – Lag Log Total Nominal Bad Loans) / (Lag Log Total Nominal Bad Loans) FR Y9-C 
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∆RWA (Log Total Nominal Risk Weighted Assets – Lag Log Total Nominal Risk Weighted Assets) / (Lag Log Total 
Nominal Risk Weighted Assets) 
FR Y9-C 
∆NI Income (Log Total Nominal Non-Interest Income – Lag Log Total Nominal Non-Interest Income) / (Lag Log Total 
Nominal Non-Interest Income) 
 
FR Y9-C 
Financial Variables (used and described in Appendix B)   
σE Standard deviation of the monthly returns on the BHC’s stock over the year (annualized) CRSP 
E Number of shares outstanding times the share price on the last day of the trading year CRSP, FR Y9-C 
B Book value of Total Liabilities FR Y9-C 
V Market value of Total Assets CRSP, FR Y9-C 
   
Board Variables   
Board Size Total number of directors on the board of the bank BoardEx 
Board Independence Total number of directors that are classified as independent / Board Size BoardEx 
Board Female% Total number of directors that are female / Board Size BoardEx 
Board Age Total age of directors of the board / Board Size BoardEx 
Board Fin. Experts% Total number of independent directors that have prior experience working as a CFO or finance director / Board 
Size 
BoardEx 
Board Avg. Quals. Total number of qualifications held by directors of the board / Board Size BoardEx 
Board Avg. Seats Total number of board seats currently held in public and private firms by directors of the board / Board Size BoardEx 
CEO Tenure Total number of years the CEO has served in this position BoardEx 
CEO Duality Dummy variable that is = 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman of the board and 0 if otherwise BoardEx 
CEO MBA Dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO has an MBA and 0 if otherwise BoardEx 
CEO Ivy League UG Dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO obtains an undergraduate degree from an Ivy League institution and 0 if 
otherwise 
BoardEx 
CEO Overconfidence Dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO holds exercisable stock options that are at least 67% in the money and 0 if 
otherwise 
ExecuComp 
CEO Depression Baby Dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO is born between 1920 and 1929 and 0 if otherwise BoardEx 
CEO Career Crisis Starter Dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO starts her career (assuming age of 22) during a crisis (as defined by the 
NBER crisis database) and 0 if otherwise 
BoardEx, NBER crisis 
database 
CEO Age Log (1+ Age of the CEO) BoardEx 
CEO Log(Salary) Log (1+ CEO Salary). Salary is expressed  ExecuComp 
CEO Log(Vega) Log (1+ Vega). Vega is the sensitivity of CEO compensation to stock return volatility, expressed in thousands ExecuComp 
CEO Log(Delta) Log (1+ Delta). Vega is the sensitivity of CEO compensation to share price, expressed in thousands ExecuComp 
   
County Variables   
County Religiosity Number of religious adherents (interpolated using 2000 and 2010 survey) / county population ARDA 
County Unemployment% County unemployment rate (%) BLS 
County Income per Cap. Average county income per capita BEA 
County HHI HHI of deposits (calculated as the summation of deposit2) in the county FDIC Summary of Deposits 
   
Other Variables   
Reg by Fed (FDIC, OCC) Dummy variable that is = 1 if the main bank subsidiary (as defined by proportion of total assets) under the 
BHC is regulated by the Fed ( FDIC, OCC) and 0 if otherwise 
Commercial Bank Call 
Report 
CPP08-13 Dummy variable that is = 1 if the BHC receives Capital Purchase Program bailout funds and 0 if otherwise for 
years after 2008 
Center for Responsive 
Politics 
Post-Crisis08-13 Dummy variable that is = 1 for years 2008 to 2013 and 0 if otherwise FR Y9-C 
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Appendix B 
Estimation of σV, V and IPP 
We follow Ronn and Verma (1986), Duan et al. (1992) and Bushman and Williams (2012) 
in estimating the two unobservables σV and V required as inputs to compute the insurance premium 
percentage (IPP). We obtain values for both σV (volatility of asset returns) and V (market value of 
assets) by solving an iterative process of two non-linear equations based on the Black-Scholes-
Merton option pricing model.  
The first Equation (A1) models the market value of a bank’s equity as a call option on the 
unobservable market value of a bank’s total assets: 
 
E = VN(X) – pBN(X – σV√T)             (A1) 
where X = (ln(V/pB ) + σ2VT/2)/(σV√T)            (A2) 
 
where E is the market value of equity, B is the book value of liabilities, T is the time to maturity 
of the option and is set to one on the assumption that the next audit occurs in one year when the 
option is re-priced following changes in the financial parameters, N() is the cumulative density of 
a standard normal variable, and p is a regulatory forbearance parameter introduced by Ronn and 
Verma (1986) that accounts for regulatory delays in exercising the option due to dissolution costs. 
p is set to 0.97 following previous research (Ronn and Verma, 1986; Hovakimian et al., 2003; 
Bushman and Williams, 2012) which allows the asset value of a bank to deteriorate to 97% of debt 
before the option is exercised.  
Using Ito’s lemma, it can be shown that: 
σE = (VN(X)σV )/(E)               (A3) 
 
where σE is the standard deviation of the monthly returns on the bank’s stock (annualized by 
multiplying by Ö12). Equation (A3) is the optimal hedge equation that relates the volatility of bank 
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equity returns to bank asset returns. A Newton search algorithm obtains annual estimates of σV and 
V by simultaneously solving Equations (A1) and (A3) in an iterative process.  
  After obtaining estimates of σV and V, we are then able to compute the fair value of IPP, 
derived by Merton (1977). 
 
IPP = N(y + σV√T) - (1 - δ)n(V/B)N(y)           (A4) 
where y = ((ln(B/V(1 - δ)n) - (σ2VT/2))/(σV√T)           (A5) 
 
where δ is the dividend per dollar of market value of assets, and n is the number of times per period 
the dividend is paid per annum. Dividends are included in the IPP valuation equation since the 
writer of the put option, the FDIC, is not dividend-protected.  
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Robustness Tests: Current Fed  
 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Current Fed Gain (Loss)i,t 
x σVi,t + α3Current Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage 
divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Current Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) 
in the number of directors of the BHC board that is currently serving in public service positions at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total 
Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix 
A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Current Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Current Fed Gain x σv 1.204*** 0.950*** 1.160***    0.465*** 0.406*** 0.462***    
 [3.653] [4.244] [3.785]    [4.669] [4.424] [4.774]    
Current Fed Loss x σv    0.13 -0.058 0.168    0.054 -0.04 0.056 
 
   [0.491] [-0.263] [0.639]    [0.637] [-0.409] [0.645] 
σv -12.275*** -8.530** -14.491*** -14.095*** -10.081*** -16.411*** -1.132 -1.338 -1.346 -1.899 -1.983 -2.126 
 [-2.717] [-2.450] [-3.150] [-3.219] [-2.825] [-3.746] [-0.736] [-0.822] [-0.859] [-1.301] [-1.207] [-1.427] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.732 0.767 0.739 0.723 0.757 0.73 0.747 0.764 0.749 0.705 0.732 0.707 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
 








Robustness Tests: Fed Directorship 
 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Directorship Gain 
(Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Directorship Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book 
value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Directorship Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is 
an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with Reserve Bank Directorship experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, 
ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to 
Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Directorship Gain (Loss)i,t x 
σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% 
respectively. 
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Directorship Gain x σv 0.264 0.173 0.299    0.156** 0.183*** 0.161**    
 [1.088] [1.048] [1.360]    [2.393] [2.699] [2.549]    
Fed Directorship Loss x σv    -0.694** -0.658*** -0.701**    -0.228*** -0.308*** -0.225*** 
 
   [-2.332] [-3.104] [-2.339]    [-2.861] [-3.556] [-2.856] 
σv -14.238*** -10.533*** -16.532*** -12.866*** -9.551*** -15.028*** -2.035 -2.446 -2.265 -1.428 -1.754 -1.65 
 [-3.314] [-3.006] [-3.771] [-3.075] [-2.872] [-3.482] [-1.390] [-1.544] [-1.510] [-1.012] [-1.184] [-1.131] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.723 0.757 0.731 0.724 0.758 0.732 0.707 0.737 0.71 0.707 0.736 0.709 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
 








Robustness Tests: Fed Advisory 
 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Advisory Gain 
(Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Advisory Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value 
of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Advisory Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase 
(decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with Federal Reserve Advisory Council experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, 
ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to 
Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Advisory Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). 
Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Advisory Gain x σv 1.335*** 1.031*** 1.273***    0.514*** 0.453*** 0.512***    
 [5.166] [5.442] [5.161]    [7.061] [6.229] [7.166]    
Fed Advisory Loss x σv    -1.008*** -1.359*** -1.024***    -0.220** -0.440*** -0.218** 
 
   [-4.741] [-11.008] [-4.868]    [-2.207] [-8.490] [-2.206] 
σv -12.320*** -8.532** -14.511*** -14.995*** -11.664*** -17.184*** -1.148 -1.32 -1.346 -1.98 -2.526 -2.194 
 [-2.740] [-2.466] [-3.175] [-3.333] [-3.371] [-3.721] [-0.748] [-0.814] [-0.861] [-1.259] [-1.536] [-1.362] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.734 0.768 0.74 0.726 0.765 0.733 0.754 0.77 0.755 0.709 0.747 0.711 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 
 
            
 
Table IA.4 
Robustness Tests: Controlling for Other Connections 
  
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks while controlling for other forms of influence. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: 
Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). 
(B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if 
there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. We further include Ex-Regulator Gain (Loss), defined 
as a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with non-public service experience at any regulatory agency and 0 if otherwise and interact it 
with σv, Politician Gain (Loss), defined as a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board who were politicians and 0 if otherwise. A politician 
is defined as having been Congressman (US Senators and US House Representatives), Deputy Secretary/Secretary of US Departments, US State Lieutenant Governors/Governors or US City Mayors) We 
also include Lobby%, defined as (Amount spent on lobbying / Total Assets) in %. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total 
Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the 
construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported 
in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
             
Fed Gain x σv 0.951** 0.611** 0.899**    0.374*** 0.303*** 0.372***    
 [2.365] [2.023] [2.335]    [2.852] [2.712] [2.873]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.828*** -1.046*** -0.834***    -0.223*** -0.399*** -0.221*** 
    [-4.015] [-6.311] [-4.175]    [-2.957] [-6.539] [-2.949] 
Ex-Regulator Gain x σv -0.257 -0.043 -0.226    -0.08 -0.009 -0.08    
 [-0.654] [-0.147] [-0.589]    [-0.546] [-0.067] [-0.547]    
Politician Gain x σv -0.281 -0.173 -0.351    -0.05 -0.053 -0.052    
 [-0.891] [-0.803] [-1.144]    [-1.015] [-1.017] [-1.134]    
Ex-Regulator Loss x σv    -0.851** -0.056 -0.721*    -0.247*** -0.200*** -0.235*** 
    [-2.147] [-0.225] [-1.769]    [-3.884] [-2.850] [-3.925] 
Politician Loss x σv    0.239 0.272** 0.183    0 0.044 -0.003 
    [0.902] [2.374] [0.741]    [-0.004] [1.326] [-0.072] 
Lobby% x σv -24.195 15.884 -25.279 -37.075 18.735 -38.092 -1.223 -20.132 0.542 -5.765 -18.722 -4.046 
 [-0.254] [0.263] [-0.260] [-0.375] [0.287] [-0.379] [-0.104] [-1.317] [0.053] [-0.583] [-1.540] [-0.449] 
σv -11.259** -8.663** -13.588*** -13.975*** -10.501*** -16.084*** -0.849 -1.222 -1.051 -1.718 -2.075 -1.928 
 [-2.219] [-2.371] [-2.666] [-3.354] [-3.344] [-3.751] [-0.504] [-0.728] [-0.611] [-1.228] [-1.518] [-1.339] 
             
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.731 0.763 0.737 0.726 0.764 0.733 0.742 0.762 0.744 0.711 0.752 0.713 
Observations 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539 2,539  
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Table IA.5 
Robustness Test: Controlling for Creditor Discipline  
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks while controlling for depositor discipline. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t 
= α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) 
is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is 
an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. We further include Core Deposits, defined as (Core Deposits 
/ Total Assets) and Sub Debt, defined as (Book value of Subordinated debt / (Subordinated debt + Tier-1 Capital)) and interact it with σv. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total 
Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix 
A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv 1.065*** 0.734*** 1.026***    0.384*** 0.336*** 0.381***    
 [3.130] [2.996] [3.172]    [3.352] [3.650] [3.360]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.847*** -0.993*** -0.848***    -0.222*** -0.400*** -0.217*** 
 
   [-4.562] [-6.592] [-4.601]    [-3.037] [-6.598] [-2.982] 
Core Deposits x σv -1.500*** -1.336*** -1.498*** -0.798 -0.612 -0.816* -0.274** -0.339** -0.272** -0.022 -0.015 -0.022 
 [-3.270] [-3.378] [-3.373] [-1.610] [-1.473] [-1.704] [-2.082] [-2.201] [-2.069] [-0.141] [-0.098] [-0.138] 
Sub Debt x σv -0.431 0.963 -0.415 -0.497 0.829 -0.494 0.102 0.094 0.131 0.096 0.039 0.126 
 [-0.588] [1.414] [-0.594] [-0.613] [1.077] [-0.643] [0.473] [0.410] [0.603] [0.404] [0.148] [0.528] 
σv -13.504*** -9.795*** -15.479*** -15.183*** -10.967*** -17.166*** -1.217 -1.529 -1.4 -1.806 -2.074 -2.007 
 [-3.130] [-3.088] [-3.517] [-4.120] [-3.783] [-4.585] [-0.785] [-0.999] [-0.881] [-1.318] [-1.579] [-1.422] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.744 0.775 0.749 0.736 0.772 0.742 0.748 0.769 0.75 0.713 0.753 0.715 
Observations 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 2,487 








Robustness Test: Controlling for Additional Board Characteristics  
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks while controlling for additional board characteristics. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following 
regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns 
(7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is 
= 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. We further include Board Female%, defined as 
(Total number of directors that are female / Board Size), Board Age, defined as (Total age of directors of the board / Board Size), Board Fin. Experts%, defined as (Total number of independent directors 
that have prior experience working as a CFO or finance director / Board Size) and Board Avg. Quals., defined as (Total number of qualifications held by directors of the board / Board Size), Board Avg. 
Seats, defined as (Total number of board seats currently held in public and private firms by directors of the board / Board Size) and interact it with σv. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, 
ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to 
Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard 
errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv 0.878*** 0.585** 0.843***    0.347*** 0.292*** 0.344***    
 [2.666] [2.495] [2.713]    [3.177] [3.383] [3.208]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.802*** -0.981*** -0.818***    -0.219*** -0.385*** -0.216*** 
 
   [-3.842] [-6.259] [-4.053]    [-2.964] [-6.452] [-2.942] 
Board Female% x σv 1.063 0.717 1.147 0.68 0.401 0.787 0.057 -0.024 0.047 -0.092 -0.179 -0.1 
 [1.361] [1.494] [1.532] [0.816] [0.777] [0.991] [0.383] [-0.137] [0.320] [-0.454] [-0.916] [-0.500] 
Board Age x σv 0 0.004 -0.002 -0.001 0.004 -0.002 0 0.001 0 0 0.001 0 
 [-0.086] [1.001] [-0.306] [-0.163] [1.052] [-0.413] [-0.196] [0.571] [-0.269] [-0.137] [0.717] [-0.217] 
Board Fin. Experts% x σv -0.115 -0.096 -0.11 -0.083 -0.055 -0.076 -0.026 -0.032 -0.027 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 
 [-1.110] [-1.017] [-1.108] [-0.898] [-0.957] [-0.886] [-0.863] [-0.825] [-0.901] [-0.790] [-0.794] [-0.841] 
Board Avg. Quals. x σv 0.09 0.043 0.083 0.071 -0.007 0.063 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.02 0.01 0.021 
 [0.488] [0.354] [0.474] [0.377] [-0.061] [0.350] [0.659] [0.697] [0.682] [0.480] [0.232] [0.496] 
Board Avg. Seats x σv 0.177* 0.056 0.172* 0.211** 0.088 0.207** 0.045 0.03 0.045 0.056* 0.044 0.056* 
 [1.684] [0.739] [1.708] [2.100] [1.366] [2.158] [1.388] [0.918] [1.406] [1.818] [1.592] [1.838] 
σv -9.084* -7.446** -11.405** -10.852** -9.230*** -13.169*** -0.389 -0.682 -0.572 -1.108 -1.591 -1.313 
 [-1.760] [-1.976] [-2.175] [-2.477] [-3.043] [-3.010] [-0.240] [-0.399] [-0.342] [-0.815] [-1.212] [-0.932] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.737 0.766 0.744 0.732 0.766 0.74 0.748 0.767 0.75 0.718 0.757 0.72 
Observations 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 2,532 
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Table IA.7 
Robustness Test: Controlling for Additional CEO Characteristics  
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks while controlling for additional CEO characteristics. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain 
(Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage 
divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the 
number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. We further include CEO MBA, defined as (a dummy that = 1 if a CEO has an MBA and 0 
if otherwise), CEO Ivy League UG, defined as (a dummy that = 1 if the CEO obtains an undergraduate degree from an Ivy League institution and 0 if otherwise), CEO Overconfidence, defined as (a 
dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO holds exercisable stock options that are at least 67% in the money and 0 if otherwise), CEO Depression Baby, defined as (a dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO is born 
between 1920 and 1929 and 0 if otherwise), CEO Crisis Career Started, defined as (a dummy variable that = 1 if the CEO starts her career (assuming age of 22) during a crisis (as defined by the NBER 
crisis database) and 0 if otherwise), CEO Age, defined as (Log (1+Age of the CEO)), CEO Log(Salary), defined as (Log (1+ CEO Salary)), CEO Log(Vega), defined as (Log (1+Vega)), and CEO 
Log(Delta), defined as (Log (1+Delta)) and interact it with σv. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, 
Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), 
IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do 
not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv -0.036 0.124 -0.02    0.190** 0.229*** 0.192**    
 [-0.141] [0.650] [-0.075]    [2.181] [2.917] [2.216]    
Fed Loss x σv    -1.001*** -0.847*** -0.995***    -0.357*** -0.357*** -0.366*** 
 
   [-3.555] [-4.070] [-3.476]    [-4.399] [-4.676] [-4.519] 
CEO MBA x σv 0.185 0.211 0.214 0.335 0.267 0.357 -0.034 0.024 -0.03 -0.004 0.026 -0.003 
 [0.859] [1.070] [0.971] [1.541] [1.561] [1.568] [-0.491] [0.324] [-0.444] [-0.063] [0.350] [-0.052] 
CEO Ivy League UG x σv 0.489* 0.355** 0.544* 0.364 0.265 0.405 0.182** 0.151* 0.189** 0.13 0.102 0.13 
 [1.725] [2.071] [1.734] [1.274] [1.491] [1.279] [2.150] [1.883] [2.198] [1.532] [1.179] [1.508] 
CEO Overconfidence x σv -0.631* -0.454* -0.638* -0.434 -0.303 -0.447 -0.008 0.024 -0.016 0.063 0.086 0.055 
 [-1.914] [-1.797] [-1.874] [-1.399] [-1.353] [-1.380] [-0.139] [0.428] [-0.284] [1.421] [1.652] [1.254] 
CEO Depression Baby x σv 1.767*** 0.516 1.931*** 1.836*** 0.584 2.030*** -0.16 -0.243* -0.187 -0.082 -0.137 -0.091 
 [2.832] [1.090] [2.695] [4.098] [1.521] [3.713] [-1.024] [-1.728] [-1.180] [-0.930] [-1.423] [-0.965] 
CEO Crisis Career Starter x σv 0.191 0.128 0.264 0.097 0.058 0.18 -0.058 -0.094* -0.06 -0.032 -0.055 -0.033 
 [1.022] [1.057] [1.423] [0.542] [0.590] [0.995] [-1.203] [-1.811] [-1.281] [-0.719] [-1.123] [-0.748] 
CEO Age x σv -0.015 0.01 -0.018 -0.027* 0.002 -0.029* 0.003 0.004 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 [-0.791] [0.855] [-0.929] [-1.820] [0.259] [-1.944] [0.563] [0.652] [0.546] [-0.166] [-0.141] [-0.144] 
CEO Log(Salary) x σv 0.079 -0.171 0.044 0.286 0.01 0.255 -0.053 -0.073 -0.05 0.037 0.027 0.043 
 [0.359] [-1.093] [0.208] [1.427] [0.074] [1.239] [-0.953] [-1.358] [-0.904] [0.753] [0.513] [0.864] 
CEO Log(Vega) x σv 0.086 0.131 0.105 0.07 0.111 0.089 0.032 0.042 0.028 0.012 0.017 0.007 
 [0.695] [1.661] [0.853] [0.634] [1.656] [0.797] [0.941] [1.168] [0.815] [0.404] [0.500] [0.234] 
CEO Log(Delta) x σv -0.173 -0.098 -0.17 -0.187* -0.103* -0.181 -0.041 -0.058* -0.042 -0.060*** -0.072*** -0.060** 
 [-1.453] [-1.447] [-1.368] [-1.779] [-1.760] [-1.624] [-1.332] [-1.951] [-1.372] [-2.795] [-3.043] [-2.602] 
 69 
σv -4.747 -1.611 -4.008 -2.855 -0.734 -2.47 -2.126 -0.951 -2.078 -2.279 -0.841 -2.433 
 [-0.520] [-0.215] [-0.446] [-0.334] [-0.115] [-0.291] [-0.960] [-0.424] [-0.844] [-1.159] [-0.395] [-1.126] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.775 0.879 0.78 0.787 0.89 0.792 0.847 0.859 0.847 0.867 0.874 0.868 
Observations 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 516 
 
























Robustness Test: Controlling for County Characteristics  
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks while controlling for depositor discipline. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t 
+ α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by 
market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of 
directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. We further include County Religiosity, defined as (Number of religious adherents / county population), 
County Unemployment%, defined as (County unemployment rate in %), County Income per Cap., defined as (Average county income per capita) and County HHI, defined as (HHI of deposits in the 
county) and interact it with σv. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, 
CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest 
is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. 
***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively.  
                          
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv 0.931*** 0.720*** 0.894***    0.363*** 0.311*** 0.359***    
 [3.065] [3.511] [3.059]    [3.590] [4.106] [3.604]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.782*** -1.051*** -0.776***    -0.234*** -0.402*** -0.229*** 
 
   [-3.512] [-8.301] [-3.628]    [-2.763] [-5.991] [-2.718] 
County Religiosity x σv -0.013 -0.001 -0.009 -0.032 -0.016 -0.028 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.011 -0.009 -0.01 
 [-0.630] [-0.103] [-0.450] [-1.461] [-0.970] [-1.281] [-0.666] [-0.593] [-0.536] [-1.611] [-1.598] [-1.524] 
County Unemployment% x σv 0.103*** 0.083*** 0.100*** 0.080*** 0.056*** 0.078*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 0.022*** 0.013* 0.016** 0.013* 
 [4.640] [4.374] [4.616] [3.678] [3.077] [3.675] [3.172] [3.888] [3.162] [1.892] [2.458] [1.860] 
County Income per Cap.  x σv 0.009 0.009** 0.009 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 [1.365] [2.226] [1.481] [0.083] [0.337] [0.141] [0.706] [0.603] [0.622] [-0.927] [-1.159] [-0.969] 
County HHI x σv 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 [-0.271] [0.730] [-0.342] [-0.428] [0.835] [-0.489] [0.003] [0.317] [-0.069] [-0.248] [0.401] [-0.313] 
σv -13.221*** -4.632 -15.152*** -14.989*** -6.562** -16.890*** -0.554 -0.411 -0.678 -1.232 -1.229 -1.365 
 [-2.724] [-1.299] [-3.103] [-3.688] [-2.355] [-4.134] [-0.331] [-0.248] [-0.399] [-0.869] [-0.976] [-0.948] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.764 0.797 0.768 0.759 0.797 0.764 0.775 0.804 0.776 0.747 0.797 0.748 
Observations 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 1,890 
 





Robustness Tests: Exclude Crisis Years 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks when excluding crisis years 2007-2008. The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We estimate the following regression: Yi,t = 
α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is 
the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an 
increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total 
Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these variables with σv. Refer to Appendix 
A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t). Standard errors are 
clustered at the bank-level and t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. We do not report the constant for brevity. ***, ** and * indicate significance level at the 1, 5 and 10% respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv 0.846*** 0.541*** 0.801***    0.336*** 0.282*** 0.332***    
 [3.025] [3.134] [3.021]    [3.643] [3.889] [3.629]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.628*** -0.667*** -0.655***    -0.200*** -0.368*** -0.202*** 
 
   [-2.955] [-4.376] [-3.211]    [-3.021] [-6.264] [-3.077] 
σv -12.363** -10.156*** -13.914*** -14.564*** -11.983*** -16.136*** -1.077 -1.493 -1.275 -1.929 -2.445* -2.16 
 [-2.511] [-2.962] [-2.753] [-3.805] [-4.342] [-4.084] [-0.652] [-0.863] [-0.759] [-1.508] [-1.902] [-1.645] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.755 0.802 0.761 0.749 0.799 0.756 0.777 0.805 0.779 0.745 0.79 0.747 
Observations 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 1,977 
 












Robustness Tests: Exclude Worst Performing Banks 
 
This table reports estimates of Equation (5) and (6) using panel OLS regressions (with different specifications) and examines the sensitivity of leverage (B/V in Columns (1)-(6)) and the value of public 
subsidies (IPP in Columns (7)-(12)) to changes in σv at Fed connected banks when excluding the worst one-third of banks in a year (as measured by ROA). The sample period is from 2002 to 2013. We 
estimate the following regression: Yi,t = α0 + α1σVi,t + α2Fed Gain (Loss)i,t x σVi,t + α3Fed Gain (Loss)i,t + Bank Controlsi,t + εi,t where i and t indexes bank and year respectively. Y is (B/V) in Columns (1)-
(6) and IPP in Columns (7)-(12). (B/V) is the book value of leverage divided by market value of assets, IPP is the value of public subsidies per dollar of debt, σv is asset volatility and Fed Gain (Loss) is a 
dummy variable that is = 1 if there is an increase (decrease) in the number of directors of the BHC board with public service experience at the Federal Reserve and 0 if otherwise. Bank Controls include: 
Tier-1 Capital, Bad Loans, ROA, Total Deposits, Log Total Assets, Log Total Assets Sq, Total Loans, Board Size, Board Independence, CEO Tenure, CEO Duality, Market Risk and the interaction of these 
variables with σv. Refer to Appendix A for description of variables and Appendix B for the construction of (B/V), IPP and σv. Our variable of interest is the coefficient on the interaction term α2 (Fed Gain 




 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V B/V IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP IPP 
 
            
Fed Gain x σv 0.998*** 0.712*** 0.948***    0.393*** 0.366*** 0.387***    
 [4.227] [4.297] [4.239]    [4.993] [6.344] [4.999]    
Fed Loss x σv    -0.054 -0.545*** -0.101    -0.111 -0.271*** -0.113 
 
   [-0.125] [-2.620] [-0.235]    [-1.301] [-4.634] [-1.333] 
σv -10.731** -6.184* -12.472*** -15.280*** -9.703*** -16.888*** -1.797 -0.951 -1.974 -3.501** -2.750*** -3.700*** 
 [-2.351] [-1.693] [-2.673] [-3.582] [-3.120] [-3.888] [-1.325] [-0.835] [-1.423] [-2.540] [-2.648] [-2.637] 
 
            
Bank Controls x σv Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank FE No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Regulator FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Size Ventile-Year FE No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.746 0.732 0.753 0.733 0.719 0.741 0.817 0.865 0.82 0.727 0.799 0.732 
Observations 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 1,735 
 
            
 
  
